amqtt is vulnerable to a remote denial of service caused by improper MQTT topic-filter validation combined with catastrophic regular-expression backtracking.
A single client can freeze the entire broker by sending one specially crafted SUBSCRIBE packet followed by one PUBLISH packet.
The vulnerability is caused by two defects:
add_subscription() validates the placement of the single-level wildcard + using substring checks for /+ and +/, rather than verifying that each /-delimited level containing + is exactly +. This allows malformed filters such as "+/" + "+" * 60 to be accepted instead of rejected with return code 0x80, as required by MQTT-4.7.1-3._matches() converts every + character into the greedy regular-expression fragment [^/]* and evaluates the resulting expression with re.fullmatch(). A filter containing many adjacent + characters can cause catastrophic backtracking when matched against a topic that partially matches but ultimately fails.Topic matching runs synchronously inside the broker’s global broadcast loop. When the malicious match is evaluated, it blocks the asyncio event loop and prevents the broker from processing any other work.
The issue was reproduced using a single raw MQTT 3.1.1 TCP connection with no third-party client dependencies.
Successful exploitation causes:
CONNACKUnder the default configuration, anonymous clients can exploit the vulnerability without credentials. When authentication is enabled, any authenticated client permitted to create arbitrary subscriptions and publish messages may still exploit it. Authentication alone is therefore not a sufficient mitigation.
pipamqtt>= 0.11.0, <= 0.11.3The vulnerable code is present in the v0.11.0 release commit, 352678c87e50e501a8a5bb91fab73c9400fa046c, and remained present on the main branch as of eeb1e254da9a1e8d9cc68ae754fcedac652e8fc0. Versions before 0.11.0 were not evaluated.
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability only. re.escape() prevents arbitrary regular-expression injection, and there is no known path to remote code execution.
No confidentiality or integrity impact has been identified. Successful exploitation causes a complete loss of availability for the affected broker process.
The issue has been patched in the v0.11.4 released version; all users should upgrade.
The completed fix:
+ to be exactly +# to occupy an entire level and appear only as the final levelSimply changing the validation logic is not sufficient defense in depth if malformed filters can reach the existing regular-expression matcher through another code path.
This is the temporary mitigation that was recommended prior to the patched release: administrators can install a topic-filtering plugin that rejects malformed wildcard subscriptions before they are added to the broker. Place the plugin in an importable Python module, enable it in the broker configuration, and restart the broker.
from amqtt.contexts import Action
from amqtt.plugins.base import BaseTopicPlugin
from amqtt.session import Session
class RejectInvalidTopicFilters(BaseTopicPlugin):
"""A plugin to prevent invalid wildcard subscriptions."""
async def topic_filtering(
self, *, session: Session | None = None,
topic: str | None = None,
action: Action | None = None
) -> bool | None:
if topic and action == Action.SUBSCRIBE:
levels = topic.split("/")
return all(
level in {"+", "#"} or ("+" not in level and "#" not in level)
for level in levels
) and "#" not in levels[:-1]
return True
config = {
...
'plugins':{
...
'myplugins.RejectInvalidTopicFilters': {}
}
}
This workaround applies when subscription requests pass through the plugin. If the broker is configured to use a persistent session plugin, restarting the broker alone is not sufficient; any persisted sessions containing malformed topic filters need to be removed.
Restarting the broker restores availability after exploitation, but the broker remains vulnerable until the patch or workaround is installed.
aMQTT thanks the following security researchers for their professional, coordinated private disclosure:
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333",
"CWE-20",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T14:43:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T20:17:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}