GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3

Suggest an improvement
Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3/GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3
Aliases
Published
2026-06-18T17:25:13Z
Modified
2026-07-13T07:26:47Z
Severity
  • 9.6 (Critical) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H CVSS Calculator
Summary
Crawl4AI: Arbitrary file write (path traversal) in crawler downloads can lead to RCE
Details

Summary

When the crawler saves a downloaded file, the destination filename was taken from attacker-influenced input and joined to the downloads directory with no confinement. A filename containing an absolute path (e.g. /etc/cron.d/evil) or ../ traversal escaped the downloads directory, giving an arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled contents. Because the written bytes are attacker-controlled, this escalates to remote code execution (overwriting a shell rc-file, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, a cron entry, or a Python module on the import path).

Affected paths

Two download sinks in crawl4ai/async_crawler_strategy.py:

  • HTTP crawler (AsyncHTTPCrawlerStrategy): the filename is parsed from the response Content-Disposition header by _extract_filename() and written via aiofiles.open(filepath, 'wb'). Reachable directly via the SDK, and via the unauthenticated Docker /crawl endpoint when an HTTPCrawlerConfig is supplied.
  • Browser crawler (AsyncPlaywrightCrawlerStrategy): the download's suggested_filename (controllable by the visited page) is joined to downloads_path and written via download.save_as().

The HTTP-strategy sink is reachable pre-auth on the default Docker deployment; both are reachable for SDK users simply by crawling an attacker-controlled URL. The default Playwright crawl path that does not trigger a download is unaffected.

Impact

Arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content as the user running the crawler, escalating to remote code execution.

Fix

Both sinks now resolve the destination through a single hardened helper (_safe_download_filepath) that reduces the attacker-influenced name to a bare basename (dropping absolute paths and .. components) and re-checks, via realpath, that the resolved path stays inside the downloads root (defeating symlink/TOCTOU escapes). A traversal attempt is rejected; normal downloads are unchanged.

Workarounds

  • Upgrade to the patched version (0.9.0).
  • Run the crawler as an unprivileged user with a dedicated, isolated downloads directory on a volume with no sensitive paths writable.
  • Enable authentication (CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN) on the Docker server.

Credits

Y4tacker - reported the Content-Disposition path traversal in the HTTP crawler with a clear PoC and a basename + realpath-containment fix recommendation.

Database specific
{
    "cwe_ids":  [
        "CWE-22",
        "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed":  true,
    "github_reviewed_at":  "2026-06-18T17:25:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at":  null,
    "severity":  "CRITICAL"
}
References

Affected packages

PyPI / crawl4ai

Package

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
0.9.0

Affected versions

0.*
0.3.0
0.3.1
0.3.2
0.3.3
0.3.4
0.3.5
0.3.6
0.3.7
0.3.8
0.3.71
0.3.72
0.3.73
0.3.74
0.3.731
0.3.741
0.3.742
0.3.743
0.3.744
0.3.745
0.3.746
0.4.0
0.4.1
0.4.3b1
0.4.3b2
0.4.3b3
0.4.21
0.4.22
0.4.23
0.4.24
0.4.241
0.4.242
0.4.243
0.4.244
0.4.245
0.4.246
0.4.247
0.4.248b3
0.4.248
0.5.0
0.5.0.post1
0.5.0.post2
0.5.0.post3
0.5.0.post4
0.5.0.post5
0.5.0.post6
0.5.0.post7
0.5.0.post8
0.6.0rc1
0.6.0
0.6.1
0.6.2
0.6.3
0.7.0
0.7.1
0.7.2
0.7.3
0.7.4
0.7.5
0.7.6
0.7.7
0.7.8
0.8.0
0.8.5
0.8.6
0.8.7
0.8.8
0.8.9

Database specific

last_known_affected_version_range
"<= 0.8.9"
source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3/GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3.json"