An attacker can use crafted requests to bypass metadata bucket name checking and put an object into any bucket while processing PostPolicyBucket. To carry out this attack, the attacker requires credentials with arn:aws:s3:::* permission, as well as enabled Console API access.
commit 67f4ba154a27a1b06e48bfabda38355a010dfca5
Author: Aditya Manthramurthy <donatello@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun Mar 19 21:15:20 2023 -0700
fix: post policy request security bypass (#16849)
Browser API access must be enabled turning off MINIO_BROWSER=off allows for this workaround.
The vulnerable code:
// minio/cmd/generic-handlers.go
func setRequestValidityHandler(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// ...
// For all other requests reject access to reserved buckets
bucketName, _ := request2BucketObjectName(r)
if isMinioReservedBucket(bucketName) || isMinioMetaBucket(bucketName) {
if !guessIsRPCReq(r) && !guessIsBrowserReq(r) && !guessIsHealthCheckReq(r) && !guessIsMetricsReq(r) && !isAdminReq(r) && !isKMSReq(r) {
if ok {
tc.FuncName = "handler.ValidRequest"
tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
}
writeErrorResponse(r.Context(), w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAllAccessDisabled), r.URL)
return
}
}
// ...
{
"severity": "HIGH",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-05T15:45:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-22T21:15:00Z",
"github_reviewed": true
}