In the optional Twitch channel plugin (extensions/twitch), allowFrom is documented as a hard allowlist of Twitch user IDs, but it was not enforced as a hard gate. If allowedRoles is unset or empty, the access control path defaulted to allow, so any Twitch user who could mention the bot could reach the agent dispatch pipeline.
Scope note: This only affects deployments that installed and enabled the Twitch plugin. Core OpenClaw installs that do not install/enable the Twitch plugin are not impacted.
openclaw (npm)>= 2026.1.29, < 2026.2.1>= 2026.2.1Affected component: Twitch plugin access control (extensions/twitch/src/access-control.ts).
Problematic logic in checkTwitchAccessControl():
allowFrom was configured, the code returned allowed: true for members but did not return allowed: false for non-members, so execution fell through.allowedRoles was unset or empty, the function returned allowed: true by default, even when allowFrom was configured.allowFrom list, but do not set allowedRoles (or set it to an empty list).allowFrom, send a message that mentions the bot (for example @<botname> hello).Authorization bypass for operators who relied on allowFrom to restrict who can invoke the bot in Twitch chat. Depending on configuration (tools, routing, model costs), this could lead to unintended actions/responses and resource or cost exhaustion.
8c7901c984866a776eb59662dc9d8b028de4f0d0Upgrade to openclaw >= 2026.2.1.
Thanks @MegaManSec (https://joshua.hu) of AISLE Research Team for reporting.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:37:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}