Browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins.
A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim's local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim's browser context.
The browser control servers bind to loopback but exposed mutating HTTP endpoints without a CSRF-style guard. Browsers may send cross-origin requests to loopback addresses; without explicit validation, state-changing operations could be triggered from a non-loopback Origin/Referer.
Mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) are rejected when the request indicates a non-loopback Origin/Referer (or Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site).
patched_versions is set to the planned next release version. Once that npm release is published, the advisory should be ready to publish with no further edits.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:53:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T22:16:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}