The max_msg_size check in the WebSocket reader added the declared frame length to the size of the partial message already buffered. In the C extension this addition is 64-bit arithmetic, so a declared length close to 2**63 overflowed and the check passed.
An attacker could bypass max_msg_size and cause unbounded memory use by streaming an oversized WebSocket message after a small non-final fragment.
If unable to upgrade, the Python reader is unaffected and can be used with AIOHTTP_NO_EXTENSIONS=1.
Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/8cfbe9abe5e11b84006a10f9bdf82bf607671dab
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-16T14:52:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-13T21:17:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}