This vulnerability allows a user i.e a free plan user to get more than the desired subdomains due to lack of db transaction lock mechanisms in https://github.com/akinloluwami/outray/blob/main/apps/web/src/routes/api/%24orgSlug/subdomains/index.ts
The affected code-:
//Race condition
const [subscription] = await db
.select()
.from(subscriptions)
.where(eq(subscriptions.organizationId, organization.id));
const currentPlan = subscription?.plan || "free";
const planLimits = getPlanLimits(currentPlan as any);
const subdomainLimit = planLimits.maxSubdomains;
const existingSubdomains = await db
.select()
.from(subdomains)
.where(eq(subdomains.organizationId, organization.id));
if (existingSubdomains.length >= subdomainLimit) {
return json(
{
error: `Subdomain limit reached. The ${currentPlan} plan allows ${subdomainLimit} subdomain${subdomainLimit > 1 ? "s" : ""}.`,
},
{ status: 403 },
);
}
const existing = await db
.select()
.from(subdomains)
.where(eq(subdomains.subdomain, subdomain))
.limit(1);
if (existing.length > 0) {
return json({ error: "Subdomain already taken" }, { status: 409 });
}
const [newSubdomain] = await db
.insert(subdomains)
.values({
id: crypto.randomUUID(),
subdomain,
organizationId: organization.id,
userId: session.user.id,
})
.returning();
The first part of the code checks the user plan and determine his/her existing_domains without locking the transaction and allowing it to run.
const existingSubdomains = await db
.select()
.from(subdomains)
.where(eq(subdomains.organizationId, organization.id));
The other part of the code checks if the desired domain is more than the limit.
if (existingSubdomains.length >= subdomainLimit) {
return json(
{
error: `Subdomain limit reached. The ${currentPlan} plan allows ${subdomainLimit} subdomain${subdomainLimit > 1 ? "s" : ""}.`,
},
{ status: 403 },
);
}
Finally, it inserts the subdomain also after the whole check without locking transactions.
const [newSubdomain] = await db
.insert(subdomains)
.values({
id: crypto.randomUUID(),
subdomain,
organizationId: organization.id,
userId: session.user.id,
})
.returning();
subdomains before the INSERT statement of request one is made.It allows the attacker to act on a not yet updated row which bypasses the checks and allow the attacker to get more subdomains.For example-:
Parallel request 1 Parallel Request 2
| |
checks for Checks the not yet updated
available subdomain row and bypasses the logic checks
and determines if it is more than limit
| |
Inserts subdomain and calls it a day Also inserts the subdomain
Repeater and create multiple requests in a single batch with different subdomain names as seen below. Lastly, send the requests in parallel.<img width="1844" height="855" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f46d5993-31bd-4b96-902a-b2de5b0518bd" />
<img width="1905" height="977" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c877de2-4b55-46f4-9f1c-78590dfebefc" />
The vulnerability provides an infiinite supply of domains to users bypassing the need for subscription
{
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-14T18:16:42Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-366"
],
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T21:53:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true
}