GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99

Source

https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99

Import Source

https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99.json

JSON Data

https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99

Aliases

CVE-2026-62331

Published

2026-11-03T17:27:25Z

Modified

2026-11-03T17:45:08Z

Severity

8.2 (High) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N CVSS Calculator

Summary

praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection)

Details

Impact

A remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (praktor-wk-<workspace>, mounted at /workspace/agent), escaping the documented uploads/ directory.

The attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (internal/telegram/bot.go, at both upload sites) and resolved with path.Join, which collapses ../ sequences. A filename like ../../../CLAUDE.md resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside uploads/.

Because the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside uploads/ lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. CLAUDE.md, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under /workspace/agent. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection).

Reachability

By default the bot has no user allowlist (allow_from: [] means "allow all"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required.

Affected versions

Through v0.9.0 (and HEAD 3902d29).

Patched versions

v0.9.1, containing PR #228.

Workarounds

Restrict telegram.allow_from to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to v0.9.1 is the recommended fix.

Fix (defense in depth)

internal/telegram/bot.go: apply path.Base() to the attacker-controlled filename at both upload sites, stripping directory components and ...
internal/container/manager.go: WriteVolumeBytes now rejects any path that escapes /vol after path.Join, protecting future callers.

Credit

Reported privately by tonghuaroot, who provided a detailed root-cause analysis, a deployed end-to-end proof of concept against the real container.Manager, and fix verification.

Database specific

{
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-03T17:27:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T19:18:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
}

References

Affected packages

Go / github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor

Package

Name: github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor; View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl: pkg:golang/github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor

Affected ranges

Type: SEMVER
Events: Introduced

0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected

Fixed

0.9.1

Database specific

last_known_affected_version_range

"<= 0.9.0"

source

"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99.json"