GHSA-4w7w-5xrc-9h26

Impact

When an originless Agent composes the redirect and cache interceptors as compose(redirect(), cache()) with a shared cache (type: 'shared'), the cache builds its key from the original request URL before the redirect handler changes the origin. The response produced after a redirect is then stored under the original key, even when the redirect crossed to a different origin.

An attacker who controls the target of a redirect from a trusted URL can have their response cached under that trusted URL. A later caller requesting the trusted URL receives the attacker's body from the shared cache without either origin being contacted, allowing persistent cache poisoning. The same key confusion also discloses private data: when an authenticated request returns a private, no-store redirect to a user-specific resource, the final response is stored under the original URL and can be served to a later unauthenticated caller.

The cache interceptor was introduced in undici 7.0.0, and all 7.x and 8.x releases before the patched versions are affected. Applications are affected only when an originless Agent, a shared MemoryCacheStore or SqliteCacheStore, and the composition compose(redirect(), cache()) are all used. Origin-bound Client and Pool dispatchers, and the reverse composition compose(cache(), redirect()), are not affected.

Patches

Upgrade to 7.30.1 or 8.12.2. Before storing a response, undici now verifies that the origin that produced it still matches the cache key, and preserves each redirect hop's cache-control policy, so cross-origin redirect responses and responses behind a no-store or private hop are no longer cached under the original key.

Workarounds

Compose the interceptors as compose(cache(), redirect()), use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores, or disable shared caching on redirect-capable requests.