Authenticated users can craft a request that reveals Execution data and logs and Job details that they are not authorized to see.
Depending on the configuration and the way that Rundeck is used, this could result in anything between a high severity risk, or a very low risk. If access is tightly restricted and all users on the system have access to all projects, this is not really much of an issue. If access is wider and allows login for users that do not have access to any projects, or project access is restricted, there is a larger issue. If access is meant to be restricted and secrets, sensitive data, or intellectual property are exposed in Rundeck execution output and job data, the risk becomes much higher.
An authenticated user could craft a request to:
read
or view
the associated Job, or ad-hoc resource.read
access, if they have read
access to view the project.export
access level.admin
access. Note: they would not be allowed to create or modify a profile for a different user, or reveal any user profile information for a different user.Some authenticated API requests were not correctly checking appropriate authorization levels:
read
access to Events.import
,scm_import
,export
, or scm_export
actions.read
or view
access to the Execution, which would reveal the Execution's option values. (run
access to the Job was still required).Upgrade to Rundeck version 3.2.6
None
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at security@rundeck.com
To report security issues to Rundeck please use the form at http://rundeck.com/security
Reporter: Justine Osborne of Apple Information Security
{ "nvd_published_at": "2020-04-29T17:15:00Z", "github_reviewed_at": "2020-04-29T16:30:45Z", "severity": "MODERATE", "github_reviewed": true, "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-200", "CWE-639" ] }