GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m

Suggest an improvement
Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m/GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m
Aliases
Published
2026-11-19T20:50:12Z
Modified
2026-11-19T21:00:04Z
Severity
  • 3.5 (Low) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
iSponsorBlockTV: SSRF via Malicious SSDP Response Spoofing in Local Device Discovery
Details

Summary

iSponsorBlockTV discovers local smart TV devices via SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol). The LOCATION URL from SSDP responses is used to fetch device capabilities without URL validation. A local network attacker can craft a malicious SSDP response with a LOCATION pointing to any internal HTTP service, causing SSRF when the application fetches device information.

Details

In src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py:92-96, upon receiving an SSDP M-SEARCH response, the code extracts the LOCATION header and makes an HTTP GET request to that URL to retrieve DIAL device description XML. The URL is not validated against expected device IP ranges, expected schemes, or private/internal IP blocklists. Any device on the LAN (or a rogue WiFi access point) can respond to SSDP M-SEARCH queries with a LOCATION pointing to internal services.

Impact

Blind SSRF against internal network services; access to home router admin interfaces, smart home controllers, NAS admin pages, and other local services; potential credential disclosure from fetched responses. It'd be able to either:

  • show a debug log line - __main__ - DEBUG - Discovered device at <attacker controlled URL>, processing... (which is normally disabled and won't be shown in the actual configurator since textual doesn't show logs unless running in dev mode and launching a second terminal to inspect log output), and make a single GET request to an "attacker controlled" url which does not leak any information back to iSponsorBlockTV itself and swallows any sort of error (parsing or an invalid response from not being a real DIAL server) (dial_client.py L131-L133)
  • make single POST request to a partly "attacker controlled" url since it'll always have the suffix /YouTube appended (dial_client.py L139) , with predefined headers {"Origin": "https://www.youtube.com","Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",} (dial_client.py L158-L161) and a predefined payload {"pairingCode": <random 12 digit code>, "theme": "cl"} which also does not leak any information back to iSponsorBlockTV itself and swallows any sort of error (parsing or an invalid response from not being a real DIAL server with a YouTube app running on it) (dial_client.py L162)

Fix

Validate SSDP LOCATION URLs: allow only http{s}:// scheme, extract the IP address, and verify it matches the SSDP sender's IP address. Reject LOCATION values pointing to private IP ranges other than the expected device subnet. (Done on v2.11.0)

Database specific
{
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T20:50:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T21:17:31Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
}
References

Affected packages

PyPI / isponsorblocktv

Package

Name
isponsorblocktv
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:pypi/isponsorblocktv

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
2.11.0

Affected versions

2.*
2.0.3
2.0.5
2.0.6
2.0.7
2.0.8
2.1.0
2.1.1
2.2.1
2.3.0
2.3.1
2.4.0
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.6.0
2.6.1
2.7.0
2.8.1
2.9.0
2.10.0

Database specific

last_known_affected_version_range
"<= 2.10.0"
source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m/GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m.json"