Refitter emits the spec's header parameter name (parameters[].name with in: header) verbatim into a Refit [Header("<name>")] attribute string without escaping
". A crafted value survives Refitter's default OpenAPI validation, breaks out of the attribute and
the enclosing interface + namespace, injects a top-level file class with a [ModuleInitializer]
method, and reopens so the file stays valid. .NET runs [ModuleInitializer] methods at assembly
load, so the attacker's code executes at application startup. Verified on Refitter 2.0.0 / .NET 8.
Notable: the breakout starts from a PARAMETER-LIST position (it closes the params and method first).
The malicious input is a header parameter name. No --skip-validation is required. The query
AliasAs and value sinks (enum, default) are escaped; the gap is in the attribute-string emission.
reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py) attached: generates with default validation, compiles into a
console app, runs it (Main does not touch the client), and shows a marker written at assembly load.
Code execution at assembly load (process startup) in any application that compiles a Refitter client
generated from an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description. Estimated Critical, e.g.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (the CNA sets the final score).
Escape every spec-derived string before emitting it into a Refit attribute (escape ", \,
reject newlines) and validate characters. We recommend auditing all attribute emissions that embed
spec-derived values, using one shared encoder.
maintainer-report.txt
make_spec.py
reproduce.sh
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T00:06:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T23:17:14Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
}