Fulcio's metaRegex() function uses unanchored regex, allowing attackers to bypass MetaIssuer URL validation and trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services.
Since the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible. A malicious actor could attempt to probe an internal network through Blind SSRF.
Upgrade to v1.8.5.
None. If anchors are included in the meta issuer configuration URL, they will be escaped before the regular expression is compiled, not making this a sufficient mitigation. Deployments must upgrade to the latest Fulcio release v1.8.5.
File: pkg/config/config.go
Function: metaRegex() (lines 143-156)
func metaRegex(issuer string) (*regexp.Regexp, error) {
quoted := regexp.QuoteMeta(issuer)
replaced := strings.ReplaceAll(quoted, regexp.QuoteMeta("*"), "[-_a-zA-Z0-9]+")
return regexp.Compile(replaced) // Missing ^ and $ anchors
}
The regex has no ^ (start) or $ (end) anchors. Go's regexp.MatchString() does substring matching, so:
Pattern: https://oidc.eks.*.amazonaws.com/id/*
Regex: https://oidc\.eks\.[-_a-zA-Z0-9]+\.amazonaws\.com/id/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]+
Input: https://attacker.com/x/https://oidc.eks.foo.amazonaws.com/id/bar
Result: MATCHES (substring found)
iss claim: https://attacker.com/path/https://oidc.eks.x.amazonaws.com/id/yGetIssuer() matches this against MetaIssuer patternsoidc.NewProvider() with attacker's URLattacker.com, not amazonaws.comjwks_uri pointing to internal service{
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-12T21:15:59Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T18:47:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}