Dulwich's filter_branch.py CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.
_apply_index_filter() at dulwich/filter_branch.py:212 calls build_index_from_tree(".", tmp_index_path, ...) which materializes all tree entries to the current working directory. The finally block (line 229-230) only cleans up the temporary index file (os.unlink(tmp_index_path)) — NOT the filesystem files written to CWD. When process_commit() processes parents recursively first (line 260), files materialized from ancestor commits persist and affect processing of descendant commits.
On dulwich 1.2.7, build_file_from_blob() has no symlink protection, and validate_path_element only validates name patterns, not filesystem state.
An attacker can craft a malicious repository where running filter_branch with an index filter writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations via symlink traversal. This achieves RCE if the write targets .git/hooks/.
evil (mode 120000, symlink → /target_dir)evil/payload (mode 100644, attacker content)filter_branch with an index filterprocess_commit() processes ancestor first → materializes evil as symlink to /target_dir in CWDos.path.exists("./evil") → True (symlink exists). build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "./evil/payload") → open("./evil/payload", "wb") follows intermediate symlink → writes to /target_dir/payloadClean the CWD between commit iterations in _apply_index_filter(), or verify that no intermediate path components are symlinks before writing files.
Reported by zx (Jace)
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T18:53:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
}