The KubeEdge NodeUpgradeJob handler constructed the keadm upgrade edge command by concatenating the user-controlled spec.version and spec.image fields into a shell command.
An authenticated user with permission to create or update NodeUpgradeJob resources through the v1alpha2 API could include shell metacharacters in either field. When the upgrade job was processed, the injected command could be executed on the targeted edge node with the privileges available to the upgrade process.
Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary command execution and compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected edge node.
The fix removes shell-based command construction and invokes keadm using a structured argument list through exec.Command.
The version and image values are passed as separate literal arguments and are no longer interpreted by a command shell.
The fixed versions:
Until a patched version is available:
NodeUpgradeJob resources to trusted administrators;spec.version or spec.image fields;KubeEdge thanks Sang-Hoon Choi (KoreaSecurity, Sejong University) for responsibly reporting this issue and for coordinating with the KubeEdge maintainers through the security disclosure process.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:37:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T17:17:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}