A path traversal vulnerability in PackageIndex
was fixed in setuptools version 78.1.1
def _download_url(self, url, tmpdir):
# Determine download filename
#
name, _fragment = egg_info_for_url(url)
if name:
while '..' in name:
name = name.replace('..', '.').replace('\\', '_')
else:
name = "__downloaded__" # default if URL has no path contents
if name.endswith('.[egg.zip](http://egg.zip/)'):
name = name[:-4] # strip the extra .zip before download
--> filename = os.path.join(tmpdir, name)
Here: https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/6ead555c5fb29bc57fe6105b1bffc163f56fd558/setuptools/package_index.py#L810C1-L825C88
os.path.join()
discards the first argument tmpdir
if the second begins with a slash or drive letter.
name
is derived from a URL without sufficient sanitization. While there is some attempt to sanitize by replacing instances of '..' with '.', it is insufficient.
As easyinstall and packageindex are deprecated, the exploitation surface is reduced. However, it seems this could be exploited in a similar fashion like https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9hx-vwmv-q579, and as described by POC 4 in https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cx63-2mw6-8hw5 report: via malicious URLs present on the pages of a package index.
An attacker would be allowed to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem with the permissions of the process running the Python code, which could escalate to RCE depending on the context.
https://huntr.com/bounties/d6362117-ad57-4e83-951f-b8141c6e7ca5 https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/issues/4946
{ "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-17T16:15:19Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-22" ], "severity": "HIGH", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-19T16:52:43Z" }