Rack::QueryParser
in version < 2.2.18
enforces its params_limit
only for parameters separated by &
, while still splitting on both &
and ;
. As a result, attackers could use ;
separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.
The issue arises because Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string
counts only &
characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n
splits on both &
and ;
. This mismatch means that queries using ;
separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing params_limit
to be bypassed.
Other safeguards (bytesize_limit
and key_space_limit
) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass.
Applications or middleware that directly invoke Rack::QueryParser
with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector.
Rack::Request
, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications, uses QueryParser
in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by default. As such, the severity is considered low, with the impact limited to edge cases where QueryParser
is used directly.
&
and ;
are counted consistently toward params_limit
.QueryParser
with an explicit delimiter (e.g., &
) to avoid the mismatch.{ "severity": "HIGH", "github_reviewed": true, "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-25T15:16:13Z", "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-25T16:39:27Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-400", "CWE-770" ] }