is_valid_eth_signature
is missing a call to finalize_keccak
after calling verify_eth_signature
.
As a result, any contract using is_valid_eth_signature
from the account library (such as the EthAccount
preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts.
In order to exploit this vulnerability, it is required to control a sequencer or prover since they're the ones executing the hints, being able to inject incorrect keccak results.
Today StarkWare is the only party running both a prover or a sequencer, greatly reducing the risk of exploit.
The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the Contracts for Cairo repository * Email us at security@openzeppelin.com