Two path traversal vulnerabilities in the local block adapter allow authenticated users to read and write files outside their designated storage boundaries.
The local block adapter in pkg/block/local/adapter.go had two path traversal vulnerabilities:
The verifyRelPath function used strings.HasPrefix() to verify that requested paths fall within the configured storage directory. This check was insufficient because it validated only the path prefix without requiring a path separator, allowing access to sibling directories with similar names.
Example: If the adapter is configured with base path /data/lakefs:
| Path | Expected | Actual |
|------|----------|--------|
| /data/lakefs/valid/file.txt | Allowed | Allowed |
| /data/lakefs_evil/secret.txt | Blocked | Vulnerable |
| /data/lakefs_backup/data.db | Blocked | Vulnerable |
The adapter verified that resolved paths stayed within the adapter's base path, but did not verify that object identifiers stayed within their designated storage namespace. This allowed attackers to use path traversal sequences in the object identifier to access files in other namespaces.
Example: With base path /data/lakefs and namespace local://repo1/userdata:
| Identifier | Resolved Path | Expected | Actual |
|------------|---------------|----------|--------|
| file.txt | /data/lakefs/repo1/userdata/file.txt | Allowed | Allowed |
| ../secrets/key.txt | /data/lakefs/repo1/secrets/key.txt | Blocked | Vulnerable |
| ../../other-repo/data.txt | /data/lakefs/other-repo/data.txt | Blocked | Vulnerable |
This vulnerability allows users with access to one namespace to read and write files in other namespaces within the same lakeFS deployment.
Authenticated lakeFS users can:
This could allow attackers to:
This vulnerability only affects deployments using the local block adapter. Deployments using S3, GCS, Azure, or other object storage backends are not affected.
Fixed in version v1.77.0.
The fixes: 1. Append a path separator to prefix checks, ensuring paths must be within the storage directory 2. Add two-level path validation: verify both that namespace paths stay within the adapter's base path AND that resolved paths stay within their designated namespace
Discovered via CodeQL static analysis.
{
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-13T16:16:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-13T19:17:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true
}