An information disclosure vulnerability in OpenClaw's tools.exec.safeBins approval flow allowed a file-existence oracle.
When safe-bin validation examined candidate file paths, command allow/deny behavior could differ based on whether a path already existed on the host filesystem. An attacker could probe for file presence by comparing outcomes for existing vs non-existing filenames.
openclaw (npm)<= 2026.2.172026.2.172026.2.18Attackers with access to this execution surface could infer whether specific files exist (for example secrets/config files), enabling filesystem enumeration and improving follow-on attack planning.
The safe-bin policy was changed to deterministic argv-only validation without host file-existence checks. File-oriented flags are blocked for safe-bin mode (for example sort -o, jq -f, grep -f), and trusted-path checks remain enforced.
bafdbb6f112409a65decd3d4e7350fbd637c7754Found using MCPwner
Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
{
"severity": "MODERATE",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-203"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-19T22:06:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": null
}