The Tilt HUD WebSocket (/ws/view) is gated by a CSRF token, but the token is served by an unauthenticated endpoint and the upgrader accepts any client that omits an Origin header. When the HUD is network-exposed, an attacker can open the HUD stream and read the developer's session state.
The upgrader accepts a connection when the csrf query parameter matches a process-wide token (websocketCSRFToken). That token is served as text/plain by an unauthenticated handler (WebsocketToken, mounted at /api/websocket_token), so any reachable caller can fetch it and connect to /ws/view?csrf=<token>. When the parameter does not match, the upgrader falls back to a same-origin check that returns true when the Origin header is absent, so a non-browser client that omits Origin is accepted anyway. The token has no per-session binding.
An attacker who can reach the HUD listener can open the HUD WebSocket and receive the full view stream — session state, Tiltfile contents, resource statuses, and continued updates — defeating the intended anti-CSWSH protection.
>= 0.24.0, <= 0.37.3.tilt up --host 0.0.0.0, or TILT_HOST set).10350).Use the default loopback bind (omit --host, unset TILT_HOST). No complete workaround short of upgrading for non-loopback deployments.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T13:53:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T22:16:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}