Using an "open at the top" range definition in RBAC for etcd roles leads to some TCPs API servers being able to read, write and delete the data of other control planes.
The problematic code is this: https://github.com/clastix/kamaji/blob/8cdc6191242f80d120c46b166e2102d27568225a/internal/datastore/etcd.go#L19-L24
The range created by this RBAC setup code looks like this:
etcdctl role get example
Role example
KV Read:
[/example/, \0)
KV Write:
[/example/, \0)
The range end \0
means "everything that comes after" in etcd, so potentially all the key prefixes of controlplanes with a name that comes after "example" when sorting lexically (e.g. example1
, examplf
, all the way to zzzzzzz
if you will).
--etcd-prefix
flag value to point to the other TCP datastore keykubectl
and will notice you're reading and writing data of another TenantFull control over other TCPs data, if you are able to obtain the name of other TCPs that use the same datastore and are able to obtain the user certificates used by your control plane (or you are able to configure the kube-apiserver Deployment, as shown in the PoC).
{ "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T16:15:15Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-284" ], "severity": "CRITICAL", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-12T18:22:06Z" }