openclaw-claude-bridge v1.1.0
v1.1.0 spawns the Claude Code CLI subprocess with --allowed-tools "" and the release notes + README claim this "disables all CLI tools" for sandboxing. This claim is incorrect.
Per the Claude Code CLI documentation, --allowed-tools (alias --allowedTools) is an auto-approve allowlist of tools that execute without permission prompts — NOT a restriction on which tools are available. The correct flag to restrict the available tool set is --tools:
--tools <tools...>Specify the list of available tools from the built-in set. Use""to disable all tools,"default"to use all tools, or specify tool names (e.g."Bash,Edit,Read").
--print non-interactive mode depends on undocumented CLI defaults (may auto-deny, may error out, may hang).The README explicitly makes a security claim the code does not uphold, creating a false sense of safety for downstream operators. If the underlying CLI behavior changes in a future version to auto-allow tools in --print mode, prompt-injection attacks could trigger arbitrary Read/Write/Bash operations in the gateway's process context.
Fixed in v1.1.1 (commit 8a296f5) by switching to --tools "". The environment variable was also renamed from CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS to CLAUDE_TOOLS to match the flag.
Setting CLAUDE_ALLOWED_TOOLS on v1.1.0 has no mitigating effect. Upgrade to v1.1.1 or manually edit dist/cli-bridge.js to replace --allowed-tools with --tools.
Found during a second-round code review.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-276"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:16:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
}