commit: e0f8d9b2047af417d8faf354b675941f3dac9891 (as-of 2026-02-04) channel: GitHub security advisory (per SECURITY.md)
The local caddy admin API (default listen 127.0.0.1:2019) exposes a state-changing POST /load endpoint that replaces the entire running configuration.
When origin enforcement is not enabled (enforce_origin not configured), the admin endpoint accepts cross-origin requests (e.g., from attacker-controlled web content in a victim browser) and applies an attacker-supplied JSON config. this can change the admin listener settings and alter HTTP server behavior without user intent.
Medium
Justification:
caddyconfig/load.go: adminLoad.handleLoad (/load admin endpoint)Attachment: poc.zip (integration harness) with canonical and control runs.
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc
cd poc/poc-F-CADDY-ADMIN-LOAD-001
make test
Expected output (excerpt):
[CALLSITE_HIT]: adminLoad.handleLoad
[PROOF_MARKER]: http_code=200 admin_moved=true response_pwned=true
Control output (excerpt):
[NC_MARKER]: http_code=403 load_blocked=true admin_moved=false response_pwned=false
An attacker can replace the running caddy configuration via the local admin API. Depending on the deployed configuration/modules, this can:
Ensure cross-origin web content cannot trigger POST /load on the local admin API by default, for example by:
/load (and other state-changing admin endpoints).{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-24T20:37:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-24T17:29:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}