MySQLWriteTool executes arbitrary SQL provided by the caller using PDO::prepare() + execute() without semantic restrictions.
This is consistent with the name (“write tool”), but in an LLM/agent context it becomes a high-risk capability: prompt injection or indirect prompt manipulation can cause execution of destructive queries such as DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, DELETE, ALTER, or privilege-related statements (subject to DB permissions).
Who is impacted: Deployments that expose an agent with MySQLWriteTool enabled to untrusted input and/or run the tool with a DB user that has broad privileges.
Not patched in: 2.8.11
Recommended improvements (even if keeping the tool intentionally powerful):
Provide a safer API that supports only constrained operations (e.g., insertRecord, updateRecord) with allowlisted tables/columns.
Add a policy/allowlist layer (e.g., allow only INSERT/UPDATE on selected tables; forbid DROP/TRUNCATE/ALTER/GRANT).
Add optional review workflow: log + require human approval for high-risk statements; or “dry-run” mode.
Document strongly that the tool must not be exposed to untrusted prompts without additional safeguards.
Do not enable MySQLWriteTool for public/untrusted agents.
Use a dedicated DB user with least privilege:
DROP, no ALTER, no GRANT, no access to sensitive tables unless necessaryAdd an application-layer policy rejecting high-risk statements (DROP, TRUNCATE, ALTER, GRANT, REVOKE, CREATE USER, etc.).
Implement authorization gating for tool calls (RBAC, allow tool use only for trusted operators).
{
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T23:15:48Z",
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-09T17:19:42Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250",
"CWE-284"
]
}