OpenClaw's SSRF hostname/IP guard did not detect ISATAP embedded IPv4 addresses (...:5efe:w.x.y.z). A crafted URL containing an ISATAP IPv6 literal could embed a private IPv4 target (for example loopback) and bypass private-address filtering in URL-fetching paths.
Rated medium: the bug weakens SSRF protections in URL fetch flows, but impact depends on reaching a URL-fetching path with attacker-controlled input and is generally constrained to internal network access attempts.
openclaw (npm)>=2026.1.20 <=2026.2.172026.2.172026.2.19Per SECURITY.md, OpenClaw's web/gateway surface is intended for local use by default, public internet exposure is out-of-scope, and prompt-injection reports are out-of-scope for bounty handling. This advisory tracks a core SSRF-guard bypass in fetch protections.
This can permit SSRF-style access attempts to internal/private network targets through URL ingestion/fetch paths that rely on shared hostname/IP blocking.
isBlockedHostnameOrIp and routed relevant validators to that shared path.d51929ecb52fe65e90bf36795f4247feb29eb8aaOpenClaw thanks @zpbrent for reporting.
{
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T18:55:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true
}