FastAPI versions lower than 0.65.2 that used cookies for authentication in path operations that received JSON payloads sent by browsers were vulnerable to a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack.
In versions lower than 0.65.2, FastAPI would try to read the request payload as JSON even if the content-type header sent was not set to application/json or a compatible JSON media type (e.g. application/geo+json).
So, a request with a content type of text/plain containing JSON data would be accepted and the JSON data would be extracted.
But requests with content type text/plain are exempt from CORS preflights, for being considered Simple requests. So, the browser would execute them right away including cookies, and the text content could be a JSON string that would be parsed and accepted by the FastAPI application.
This is fixed in FastAPI 0.65.2.
The request data is now parsed as JSON only if the content-type header is application/json or another JSON compatible media type like application/geo+json.
It's best to upgrade to the latest FastAPI.
But still, it would be possible to add a middleware or a dependency that checks the content-type header and aborts the request if it is not application/json or another JSON compatible content type.
If you have any questions or comments, write to security@tiangolo.com
{
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-09T13:34:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-09T18:15:00Z"
}