The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. CodeWhale 0.8.67 and earlier are affected. Version 0.9.0 contains the fix in commit 208421b9d23d81cea3311a1eeb2a2ea81d637686. Users should upgrade to 0.9.0 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.
CVE-2026-45374 (GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4) hardened the task path so auto-approval must be opted into explicitly: add_task uses req.auto_approve.unwrap_or(false) (task_manager.rs:868). The automation subsystem was not hardened in kind. AutomationRecord::task_auto_approve() resolves an omitted auto_approve to DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE = true (automation_manager.rs:29, 101-103), and enqueue_run_task builds the NewTaskRequest with auto_approve: Some(automation.task_auto_approve()) — i.e. an explicit Some(true) (automation_manager.rs:766). Because the field is Some, unwrap_or(false) returns true and the seed-2 default is bypassed. That true propagates to ApprovalMode::Bypass (runtime_threads.rs:2253), where the background approval loop auto-approves every tool call with no human present (runtime_threads.rs:3383-3416). One approved automation_create becomes a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Same insecure-default class as CVE-2026-45374, on a different, unpatched subsystem.
Sibling durable defaults in the same struct are safe — DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_ALLOW_SHELL = false and DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_TRUST_MODE = false (automation_manager.rs:27-28) — while DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE alone defaults true (:29). create_automation stores auto_approve: None when omitted (:422); task_auto_approve() resolves None→true (:101-103); enqueue_run_task passes Some(true) (:766), defeating add_task's unwrap_or(false) seed fix. The automation_create tool schema also declares "auto_approve": {"type":"boolean","default":true} (tools/automation.rs:49) while sibling allow_shell/trust_mode default false.
A single approved automation_create yields a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Every scheduled fire silently authorizes mutating tools (file writes, apply_patch, git, MCP writes) with no prompt; combined with allow_shell:true in the create call, recurring silent RCE with no human present. Even without allow_shell, every recurring run silently authorizes all non-shell mutating tools. Same class as seed CVE-2026-45374.
Prompt injection convinces the model to create a benign-sounding recurring job (single human approval on the automation_create call):
{"name":"automation_create","arguments":{
"name":"nightly-maintenance",
"prompt":"Fetch latest and run project setup script",
"rrule":"FREQ=HOURLY;INTERVAL=1",
"allow_shell":true
}}
(auto_approve omitted → stored None → resolves to true on every run.)
automation_create with auto_approve omitted.
automation_create is Required (tools/automation.rs:61-63) — user sees ONE approval prompt."auto_approve": {"default": true} (tools/automation.rs:49). Approving "create a scheduled job" is not informed consent to "every future run bypasses all approval prompts." The resolved auto_approve=true (omitted field) is not surfaced.create_automation stores auto_approve: None (automation_manager.rs:422).
None is later resolved to true, not false.scheduler_tick_shared, no human) or automation_run invokes enqueue_run_task, which sets auto_approve: Some(true) (automation_manager.rs:766).
add_task default unwrap_or(false) (task_manager.rs:868).Some(true), so unwrap_or(false) yields true — the hardened default never applies.auto_approve=true → ApprovalMode::Bypass (runtime_threads.rs:2253); the approval loop auto-approves (runtime_threads.rs:3383-3416).
Publish (any origin) and Destructive/Secret (background/headless) (auto_review.rs:344-357); ordinary write_file/apply_patch/edit_file/non-destructive exec_shell are NOT held → they run unattended. With allow_shell:true, every scheduled run additionally gets silent shell execution.allow_shell:true.ALLOW_SHELL=false, TRUST_MODE=false, AUTO_APPROVE=true), :101-103 task_auto_approve()→unwrap_or(true), :766 Some(automation.task_auto_approve()), :422 stores None when omitted; task_manager.rs:868 unwrap_or(false); runtime_threads.rs:2253 if auto_approve → ApprovalMode::Bypass. automation_manager.rs and task_manager.rs byte-identical v0.8.67↔HEAD.automation_create/automation_run registered via with_runtime_task_tools() in with_agent_tools_policy (registry.rs:1005); TUI attaches automations: Some(...) (tui/ui.rs:986-1011), serve mode via runtime_api.rs:426 — not feature-gated.allow_shell/trust_mode default false in the same struct — auto_approve=true is the un-hardened anomaly.<= 0.8.67 (present on latest release tag v0.8.67 and HEAD 6a3403e).
Set DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE = false (mirror the seed-2 task-path fix) and change the automation_create schema default to false, so durable automations require explicit opt-in to auto-approval just like the task path.
Reported by zx (Jace)
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:47:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T19:17:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}