A flaw in callback URL validation allowed crafted redirect_uri values containing URL userinfo (@) to bypass legitimate callback pattern checks. If an attacker can trick a user into opening a malicious authorization link, the authorization code may be redirected to an attacker-controlled host.
Fixed in v2.3.1 (commit 3a339e33191c31b68bf57db907f800d9de5ffbc8).
The fix replaces delimiter-based callback matching with structured URL pattern matching and updates validation logic/tests.
@) at reverse proxy / app policy level if feasible.{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T17:24:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T17:38:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}