The file packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts
implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. It executes the following command in a new shell (process.env.ComSpec
on Windows, usually C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
):
https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/blob/140e2f0eb0df79c2a46e35024e96d0563355fc89/packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts#L35-L41
Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by cmd.exe
expands any environment variable found in command-line above.
This creates a situation where verifySignature()
can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid.
This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.).
This vulnerability was patched in #8295, by comparing the path in the output of Get-AuthenticodeSignature
with the intended one. The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.
{ "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T18:15:10Z", "severity": "HIGH", "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-09T17:48:21Z", "github_reviewed": true, "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-154", "CWE-295" ] }