In OpenClaw's macOS node-host path, system.run allowlist parsing in security=allowlist mode failed to reject command substitution tokens when they appeared inside double-quoted shell text.
Because of that gap, payloads like echo "ok $(id)" could be treated as allowlist hits (first executable token echo) while still executing non-allowlisted subcommands through shell substitution.
openclaw2026.2.21-2<= 2026.2.21-22026.2.22Notes:
- Default installs are not affected (security=deny by default).
- The issue requires opting into security=allowlist on the macOS node-host path.
Approval/authorization bypass in allowlist mode that can lead to unintended command execution on the node host.
security=allowlist.on-miss or off./bin/echo).Use a shell-wrapper command where the visible executable is allowlisted but the quoted payload contains substitution:
/bin/sh -lc 'echo "ok $(/usr/bin/id > /tmp/openclaw-poc-rce)"'/bin/echoBefore the fix, allowlist analysis could resolve this as allowlisted while shell substitution still executed.
2026.2.22 (or newer) when released.always or set security mode to deny.90a378ca3a9ecbf1634cd247f17a35f4612c6ca6patched_versions is pre-set to planned next release 2026.2.22. After npm release is out, advisory can be published directly.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"github_reviewed": true,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T02:16:22Z",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:41:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}