parseEfiSignatureList() in attest/internal/events.go does not skip
SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes before reading EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.
For hashSHA256SigGUID lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.
After binary.Read(&signatures.Header) reads 28 bytes, buf points to the start of the SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at sigOffset := 0 instead of sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.
All versions through commit f877374 (2026-05-15).
Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502
SignatureHeaderSize must not exceed remaining list spaceSignatureHeaderSize bytes before both entry loopsTestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1285",
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T15:04:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T02:16:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}