authentik's SAML Source ACS endpoint is vulnerable to XML Signature Wrapping when validating upstream SAML responses. An attacker with any account at the upstream IdP can reuse a valid signed assertion to authenticate as another federated user.
### Patches
authentik 2026.5.1, 2026.2.4 and 2025.12.6 fix this issue.
### Impact
Affected: authentik deployments using a SAML Source for upstream SAML federation with signed assertions, or signed responses without signed assertions. Not affected: deployments that do not use SAML Source for upstream SAML federation.
The SAML Source trusts that the verified XML signature belongs to the assertion or response that authentik later consumes. A crafted SAML response can make signature verification succeed against the attacker's original signed assertion while authentik reads identity data from a different forged assertion.
An attacker first completes a legitimate login to the upstream IdP and captures the signed SAML response sent through their browser. They then submit a modified response to the ACS endpoint where the valid signature still verifies, but the consumed assertion contains a victim identifier or attacker-chosen attributes.
The attacker can authenticate as a victim who has previously used the SAML Source, or as a local user matched by forged email or username when those matching modes are enabled.
### Workarounds
Disable affected SAML Sources, or block access to their ACS endpoints.
### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
{
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T20:25:48Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
]
}