An authorization bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy as part of the email_domain enforcement option. An attacker may be able to authenticate with an email claim such as attacker@evil.com@company.com and satisfy an allowed domain check for company.com, even though the claim is not a valid email address.
The issue ONLY affects deployments that rely on email_domain restrictions and accept email claim values from identity providers or claim mappings that do not strictly enforce normal email syntax. The practical risk ONLY exists in self-hosted or custom OIDC environments and federated setups where unexpected claim values can reach oauth2-proxy. Standard hosted providers that enforce valid email formatting ARE NOT effected.
Users should upgrade to v7.15.2 or later once available.
The most effective workaround is to ensure the configured identity provider cannot emit malformed or attacker-controlled email claim values.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-15T19:23:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T17:16:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}