These endpoints accept a client-controlled credential parameter. The server loads credentials by id and uses them directly, without checking whether that credential belongs to the caller’s workspace. If an attacker knows another workspace’s credentialId, they can use that workspace’s OpenAI key.
Route permissions (assistants:*) only check feature access. They do not check credential ownership. The controller passes req.query.credential straight to the service. The service does findOneBy({ id: credentialId }), decrypts the credential, and calls OpenAI APIs. There is no workspaceId check in this flow, so this is an IDOR.
/api/v1/openai-assistants-vector-store and set credential to B’s credential ID. GET /api/v1/openai-assistants-vector-store?credential=<B_credentialId>. {
"nvd_published_at": null,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-04T17:51:48Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"severity": "HIGH"
}