DOMPurify allows ADD_ATTR to be provided as a predicate function via EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck. When the predicate returns true, _isValidAttribute short-circuits the attribute check before URI-safe validation runs. An attacker who supplies a predicate that accepts specific attribute/tag combinations can then sanitize input such as <a href="javascript:alert(document.domain)"> and have the javascript: URL survive, because URI validation is skipped for that attribute while other checks still pass. The provided PoC accepts href for anchors and then triggers a click inside an iframe, showing that the sanitized payload executes despite the protocol bypass.
Predicate-based allowlisting bypasses DOMPurify's URI validation, allowing unsafe protocols such as javascript: to reach the DOM and execute whenever the link is activated, resulting in DOM-based XSS.
Identified by Cantina’s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).
{
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T03:46:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-183"
]
}