GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2

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Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2023/03/GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2/GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2
Aliases
Published
2023-03-16T16:04:42Z
Modified
2023-11-08T04:12:02.023010Z
Severity
  • 8.2 (High) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
On a compromised node, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs
Details

Impact

If a malicious user has taken over a Kubernetes node where virt-handler (the KubeVirt node-daemon) is running, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs.

This can be misused to lure-in system-level-privileged components (which can for instance read all secrets on the cluster, or can exec into pods on other nodes). This way a compromised node can be used to elevate privileges beyond the node until potentially having full privileged access to the whole cluster.

The simplest way to exploit this, once a user could compromise a specific node, is to set with the virt-handler service account all other nodes to unschedulable and simply wait until system-critical components with high privileges appear on its node.

Since this requires a node to be compromised first, the severity of this finding is considered Medium.

Patches

Not yet available.

Workarounds

Gatekeeper users can add a webhook which will block the virt-handler service account to modify the spec of a node.

An example policy, preventing virt-handler from changing the node spec may look like this:

apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
  name: virthandlerrestrictions
spec:
[...]
  targets:
    - libs:
        - |         
[...]          
          is_virt_handler(username) {
              username == "system:serviceaccount:kubevirt:virt-handler"
          }
          mutates_node_in_unintended_way {
            # TODO
            # only allow kubevirt.io/ prefixed metadata node changes
          }
      rego: |
[...]

        violation[{"msg": msg}] {
          is_virt_handler(username)
          mutates_node_in_unintended_way(input.review.object, input.review.oldObject)
          msg := sprintf("virt-handler tries to modify node <%v> in an unintended way.", [input.review.object.name])
        }

and applying this template to node modifications.

Credits

Special thanks to the discoverers of this issue:

Nanzi Yang (nzyang@stu.xidian.edu.cn) Xin Guo (guox@stu.xidian.edu.cn) Jietao Xiao (jietaoXiao@stu.xidian.edu.cn) Wenbo Shen (shenwenbo@zju.edu.cn) Jinku Li (jkli@xidian.edu.cn)

References

https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/issues/9109

Database specific
{
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-15T21:15:00Z",
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-16T16:04:42Z",
    "severity": "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-863"
    ]
}
References

Affected packages

Go / kubevirt.io/kubevirt

Package

Name
kubevirt.io/kubevirt
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:golang/kubevirt.io/kubevirt

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Last affected
0.59.0