An unsafe deserialization vulnerability in Scapy <v2.7.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code when a malicious session file is locally loaded via the -s option. This requires convincing a user to manually load a malicious session file.
Scapy’s interactive shell supports session loading using gzip-compressed pickle files:
./run_scapy -s <session_file.pkl.gz>
Internally, this triggers:
# main.py
SESSION = pickle.load(gzip.open(session_name, "rb"))
Since no validation or restriction is performed on the deserialized object, any code embedded via __reduce__() will be executed immediately. This makes it trivial for an attacker to drop a malicious .pkl.gz in a shared folder and have it executed by unsuspecting users.
The vulnerability exists in the load_session function, which deserializes data using pickle.load() on .pkl.gz files provided via the -s CLI flag or programmatically through conf.session.
Affected lines in source code: https://github.com/secdev/scapy/blob/master/scapy/main.py#L569-L572
try:
s = pickle.load(gzip.open(fname, "rb"))
except IOError:
try:
s = pickle.load(open(fname, "rb"))
This is a classic deserialization vulnerability which leads to Code Execution (CE) when untrusted data is deserialized.
Any user who can trick another user into loading a crafted .pkl.gz session file (e.g. via -s option) can execute arbitrary Python code.
pickle)CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N.pkl.gz){
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-22T16:45:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}